LexDAYA NAND versus STATE OF HARYANA
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[2008] 5 S.C.k 1043 ,._j DAYA NANO A V. STATE OF HARYANA (Criminal Appeal No. 595 of 2005) APRIL 3, 2008 B ' (DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.) 4- Penal Code, 1860; Ss. 299, 300, 302, 304 Part I and Ill Arms Act, 1959; S.27: Culpable homicide/murder - Appellant, at the instance c of his father; allegedly fired a shot at the deceased resulting in his death - F /. R. - Investigation - Charge-sheet - Trial Court found appellant guilty of committing the offence of murder punishable u/s.302 /PC and s. 27 of the Arms Act but found evidence against accused father of the appellant insufficient D ~ to convict him - Appeal dismissed by High Court - Correctness of - Held: According to the law laid down in the case of Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab even if the intention of the accused was limited to the infliction of bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and did not E extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would not be murder - Considering the evidence on record in the background of the principles of law, the inevitable conclusion is that the appropriate conviction would be u/s.304 Part II !PC - Conviction altered accordingly - Sentence restricted to the F period already undergone - Sentencing. ~ 'Culpable homicide' and 'murder' - Distinction between - Discussed. According to the prosecution, on the fateful day, an altercation took place between PW5 and his brothers G including the deceased on the one side and accused persons including the appellant on the other. Accused 'A' allegedly exhorted his son, appellant, to fire a shot at the 1043 H 1044 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R. A deceased. Appellant fired a shot, which hit the deceased resulting in bleeding injury. PW5 and PW6, brothers of the deceased, had taken the victim to a hospital, where he was declared dead. On the basis of an information received from the hospital, an FIR was recorded by the B Police and after investigation of the case, charge sheet was filed against the accused appellant u/s.302 IPC and s. 27 of the Arms Act and against his father u/s.302 r/w s.34 IPC. Trial Court found the prosecution evidence cogent and credible as against the appellant and C accordingly convicted him for committing the offence of murder punishable u/s. 302 IPC and sentenced him accordingly but found the evidence as against father of the appellant insufficient, and acquitted him. Appeal filed thereagainst by the appellant was dismissed by the 0 Division Bench of the High Court. Hence the present appeal. E Appellant contended that s.302 IPC has no application in the facts and circumstances Of the case. Partly allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 'Culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic F offence, the IPC practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, 'culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the gravest t-" form of culpable homicide, which is defined in s.300 IPC as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable G homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the first part of s.304 IPC. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three H grades. Cul.pable homicide of this degree is punishable DAYA NANO v. STATE OF HARYANA 1045 under the second part of s.304 IPC. (Para - 10) [1050-E, A F & G] 1.2 The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed the Courts. The confusion is caused, if Courts B ... losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms -+ used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in c focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Ss. 299 and 300 IPC. (Para - 11) [1050-H; 1051-A & B] 1.3 For cases to fall within clause (3) of s.300 IPC, it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional 0 bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of na
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