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DAU DAYAL versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

Citation: [1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 639 · Decided: 24-11-1958 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
DAU DAYAL 
v. 
639 
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
(VENKATARAMA AIYAR, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR 
and A. K. SARKAR, J J.) 
Criminal Trial-Counterfeiting trade mark-Limitation, of one 
year for proscwtion-Prosecu.tion, when commences-Whether on 
filing of complaint or on issite of process-Indian Merchandise 
Marks Act, I889 (4 of I889), s. IS. 
On April 26, l9S4ยท the appellant was arrested for offences 
under ss. 420, 482, 483, 48S and 486 Indian Penal Code and bidis 
alleged to bear counterfeit trade marks were seized from him. 
On this a complaint was filed on May 26, against the appellant 
that he was in possession of counterfeit bidis, wrappers and labels. 
After investigation, the police submitted a charge sheet on 
September 30, l9S4. and summons was ordered to the appellant 
on July 22, l9SSยท The appellant raised a preliminary objection 
before the Magistrate that the proceedings were barred by s. IS 
of the Indian Merchandise Marks Act. He contended that the 
offence was discovered on April 26, I9S4. when he was arrested 
and the prosecution which commenced with the issue of process 
against him on July 22, l9S4. was beyond the period of one year 
provided by s. lS. 
Held, that the prosecution was not barred by s. IS as the 
prosecution commenced on the presentation of the complaint 
which was within one year of the discovery of the offence and 
not on the issuing of th<\ process. It is settled law that unless 
there is something to the contrary in the statute, when a private 
complaint is presented it is the date of presentation thereof that 
marks the commencement. of the prosecution. The period of 
limitation is intended to operate against the complainant and not 
against the Court. It will defeat the object of the Act and 
deprive traders of the protection of the law if it were held that 
the complaint should be thrown out unless process was issued 
within one year of the discovery of the offence. 
CRlllINAL 
APPELLATE 
JURISDICTION: 
Criminal 
Appeal No. 118 of 1958. 
Appeal from the judgment a.nd order dated Ma.y 
14, 1958, of the Alla.ha.bad High Court in Criminal 
Revision No. 1594 of 1956, a.rising out of the judgment 
a.nd order of the Court of Additional Sessions Judge 
at Kanpur in Criminal Revision No. 13 of 1956. 
0. P. Lal, for the appellant. 
November a4. 
\ 
Dau Dayal 
v. 
The State of 
Uttar Pradesh 
Venkataram:J 
Aiyar ]. 
640 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp. 
Gopi Nath Dikshit, for the respondent. 
1958. November 24. 
The Judgment of the Court 
was delivered by 
VEN~ATARAMA AIYAR, J.-The facts leading up to 
this appeal are these: On April 26, 1954, the appellant 
was arrested by the Sisamau Police for offences under 
ss. 420, 482, 483, 485 and 486 of the Indian Penal Code 
on the allegation that he was in possession of 25 packets 
of 'Chand Chhap Biri', which were alleged to bear 
counterfeit trade marks. On May 26, 1954, one Harish 
Chandra Jain acting on behalf of Messrs. Mohan Lal 
Hargovind Das filed a complaint charging that the 
appellant was in possession of counterfeit bidis; wrap-
pers and labels and praying that a case under the 
sections above mentioned be registered and investigat-
ed. On that, the Magistrate passed the following 
order: 
"S. 0. Sisamau. Please investigate and register 
a case." 
After investigation, the police submitted their charge-
sheet on September 30, 1954, and summons was order-
ed to the appellant on July 22, 1955. On September 
17, 1955, the appellant filed an application before the 
Magistrate wherein he raised a preliminary objection 
that the proceedings were barred by s. 15 of the 
Indian Merchandise Marks Act, 1889 (4 of 1889), 
hereinafter Teferred to as the Act. That section pro-
vides: 
"No such prosecution as is mentioned in the last 
foregoing section shall be commenced after the expira-
tion of three years next after the commission of the 
offence, or one year after the first discovery thereof by 
the prosecutor, whichever expiration first happens." 
The contention of the appellant was that the offence 
was discovered on April 26, 1954, when he was arrest-
ed and the goods seized, and that, in consequence, the 
issue of process on July 22, 1955, was beyond the 
period of one year provided under s. 15 of the Act, and 
that the proceedings should therefore be quashed as 
barred by limitation. The Magistrate rejected this 
contention, and a Revision Petition preferred against 
this order to the Additional Sessions J

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