LexDARYAO AND OTHERS versus THE STATE OF U. P. AND OTHERS
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] 1961 Amending Act making notices which were in accord- ance with the previous law ineffective. In these cir- Jivabkai h C l H h C Pu,,holtam cumstances t e a cutta ig ourt was right in v. holding that the amendment did not affect notices Chhagan Ka•son already given. No such question however arises in & Othm the present case. The period of notice is the same before and after the amendment in the present case, Wanchoo f. and what we have to sec is whether the crucial date for the application of the new sub-section (2-A) is the date of the notice or the date of the termination of the tenancy. We have already held that that date must be the date of the termination of the tenancy. In the circumstances the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. klarc!t 27. Appeal dismissed. DARYAO AND OTHERS v. THE STATE OF U. P. AND OTHERS (and Connected Petitions) (P. B. G.AJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.) Fundamental Right-Res juaicata-Dismissal of writ petition by High Court-If and when bar to petition in Supreme Court- Constitution of India, Arts. 32, 226. Where the High Court dismisses a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution after hearing the matter on the merits on the ground that no fundan1ental right was proved or contraw vened or that its contravention was constitutiona11y justified, a subsequent petition to the Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution on the same facts and for the same reliefs filed by the same party would be barred by the general principle of res judicata. There is no substance in the plea that the judgment of the High Court cannot be treated as res judicata because it cannot - 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 575 under Art. 226 entertain a petition under Art. 32 of the Con- r96r stitution. Citizens have ordinarily the right to invoke Art. 32 for Daryao &- Others appropriate relief if their fundamental rights are illegally or v. unconstitutionally violated and it is incorrect to say that Art. The State 0!. U. P. 32 merely gives this Court a discretionary power as Art. 226 & Otheis does to the High Court. Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi and Rajasthan, [r959] Supp. I li.C.R. 528, referred to. "- Laxmanappa Hanumantappa Jamkhandi v. The Union of India, [1955] r S.C.R. 769, and Diwan Bahadur Seth Gopal Das Mohta v. The Union of India, [r955] r S.C.R. 773, considered. .. The right given to the citizens to move this Court under Art. 32 is itself a fundamental right and cannot be circumscrib- ed or curtailed except as provided by the Constitution. The expression "appropriate proceedings" in Art. 32 (r). properly construed, must mean such proceedings as may be appropriate to the nature of the order, direction or writ the petitioner seeks from this Court and not appropriate to the nature of the case. Ramesh Thappar v. The State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 594, referred to. Even so the general principle of res judicata, which has its founrtation on considerations of public policy, namely, (1) that binding decisions of courts of competent jurisdiction should be final and (2) that no person should be made to face the same kind of litigation twice over, is not a mere technical rule that cannot be applied to petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitition. Duchess of Kingston's case, 2 Smith Lead. Cas. r3th Ed . 644, referred to. The binding character of judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction is in essence a part of the rule of Jaw on which the administration of justice, so much emphasised by the Constitu- tion, is founded and a judgment of the High Court under Art. 226 passed after a hearing on merits as aforesaid must bind the parties till set aside in appeal as provided by the Constitution and cannot be circumvented by a petition under Art. 32. Pandit M. S. M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha, [1961] I S.C. R. 96 and Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sm, [1953] S.C.R. I 54, relied on. Janardan Reddy v. The State of Hyderabad, [r95r] S.C.R. 344, Syed Qasim Rezvi v. The State of Hyderabad, [1953] S.C.R. 589 and Bhagubhai Dullabhabhai Bhandari v. The District Magistrate, Thana, [1956] S.C.R. 533, referred to. It was not correct to say that since remedies under Art. 226 and Art. 32 were in the nature of alternate remedies the adoption of one could not bar the adoption of the other, Mussammat Guiab K
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.