DANIRAIJI VRAJLALJI, JUNAGADH versus VAHUJI MAHARAJ SHRI CHANDRAPRABHA WIDOW OF DECEASED MAHARAJ SHRI PURUSHOTTAMLALJI RAGHUNATHLALJI JUNAGADH

Citation: [1975] 3 S.C.R. 32 · Decided: 13-12-1974 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

DANIRAIJI VRAJLALJI, JUNAGADH 
\'. 
V AHUJI MAHARAJ SHRI CHANDRAPRABHA WIDOW 
DECEASED MAHARAJ SHRI PURUSHOTTAMLALJI 
RAGHUNATHLALJI JUNAGADH 
December 13, 1974 
OF 
[K. K. MATHEW, P. N. BHAGWATI A:~o N. L. UNTWALIA, JJ.] 
Hi11du Adoptions and Mai11te1uincc 
Act, (78 of 1956) Ss. 4, 15 and 30-
Goda Dutta adoption made before commencement of Act-Custom of revoca-
bihy of suclz adoption-ff affected by Act. 
Section 4(a) of r:he Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, provides that 
any c.ustom of Hindu law in force immediately before the commencement of the 
Act, shall c~.1se to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is 
mad~ in the Act. Section 15 provides that no adoption which has been validly 
made can be cancelled by the adoptive father or mother nor can the adopt1~d 
person renounce st1ch status; and s. 30 provides that nothing contained in the 
Ac:t shall affect any adoption made before its commencement, and, the Vhli!Jity 
and effect of anv such adoption shall be determined as if the Act had not\:; .~n 
pas>ed. 
The appellant claimed that he was adopted by the respondent in 1956, before 
the Act c"me into force, in the 'Goda Datta' form. 
The respondent filed a suit 
for a declaration that the appellant was not so adopted, and while the suit wa~ 
pending, she made a written declaration stating, (a) that the adoption had nevei 
taken place. and (b) that even if it was be\ie;ed that it had taken place it stood 
revoked b': that document. The trial court decreed the suit and the High CoQrl 
confirmed· the decree. 
(Per Bhagwati and Untwalia, JJ.) 
Dismi•.>ing the appeal to this Court. 
HELD : An adoption in the 'goda datta' form mad~ before the commence-
m~nt of the Act, can be cancelled after the coming into force of that Act. 
(Per Bhagwati, J.), 
(a) Section 15 has no appli:ation to adoption made prior to the corning 
into the force of the Act. The first pa;t of s. 30 enacts the main saving provi-
sion. 
The second part is merely a provision introduced rx abundant: cautela with 
a view to emphasizing that the v<1lidity and e.ffect c,f the adoption made before 
the comm~ncement of the Act sha 11 remain untouched by the provisions of the 
Act. It is clear from the plain and unambiguous language of the first part ot 
the section. that the legislature intended to excl> 'e the applicability of all provi-
sions conlained in ;he Act to an adopcion made uefore the 0:ommencement of 1the 
Act and not merely the applicability of those provisions which affect the validity 
and effect of such adoption. The true meaning and effect of the first part of 1tbe 
section uninhibited by the provisions in the second part, is that nothing contained 
;n the Act shall affect any adoption made prior to the commencement of the Act. 
·The word 'affect' is a word of wide import and in the context in which it occ.urs 
it must be construed to mean 'touch' of 'relate to' or 'concern'. Therefore, noth· 
ing contained in the Act shall touch or apply to an adoption made prior to the 
commencement' of the Act. So construed, what s. 30 enacts is that nothing C-On-
tained in the Act--and that includes s. 15-shall touch or concern, or in other 
words apply to an adoption made prior to the Act. 
[37C-38D; 39Cj 
(b) The intend'ment and effect of s. 4(a) of the Act is to abrogate the existing 
law or custom in .so far as it is replaced by the law enacted in the statute. If 
there is a provision made in the stat11te which operates in the same area as the 
existing law or custom, the statutory provision mmt prevail and the existing law of 
custom must give way. If s. 15 were applicable to an adoption made prior to 
the Act it would govern the matter of cancellation; but the section applies only to 
an adortion made' after the commencement of the Act, and therefore, so far as 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
A 
B 
c 
f 
G 
H 
DANIRAIJI v. VAHUJI (Mathew, J.) 
33 
the matter relatir1g to cancellation of an adoption made before the act is con-
cerned, an; existing law or custom making provision in that behalf cannot be said 
to have been :.,brogated by reason of s. 4(a). Hence, if an adoption could b; 
cancelled by the adopter prior to the commencement of the Act, the right of the 
adopter to cancel it is not taken away. Such a custom enabl;ng cancellation would 
continue in force and govern the matter of cancellation of an adoption made b~­
fore the commencement of the Act. 
[39E-H] 
( c) Prior to the commencement of the Act, by custom, a go

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