LexDANIAL LATIFI AND ANR. versus UNION OF INDIA
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DANIAL, LATIFI AND ANR.
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v.
UNION OF INDIA
SEPTEMBER 28, 2001
[G.B. PATTANAIK, S. RAJENDRA BABU, D.P. MOHAPATRA,
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DORAISWAMY RAJU AND SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, JJ.]
Muslim Law:
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986:
Constitution validity-Act excluded Muslim divorced woman from the
provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C.-Further, under S.3 Muslim divorced woman
was entitled to reasonable and fair provision and maintenance within the
period of iddat by her former husband-Held: The Act is constitutionally
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valid-Reasonable and.fair provision extending beyond the iddat period must
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be made by the husband within the iddat period-Liability of Muslim husband
to pay maintenance to his divorced wife is not confined to iddat period-A
divorced Muslim woman, who has not remarried, may proceed against her
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relatives for her maintenance-{{ relatives unable to pay maintenance State
Wakf Board to pay such maintenance-The Act does not offend Arts. 14, 15 and
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21-Constitution of India, 1950 Arts. 14, 15 and 21-Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, S.125.
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Interpretation of Statutes:
Rule of construction-Provisions of a Statute-Possibility of two
constructions-Preference of-Held: That construction, if permissible, which
makes the Statute effective and operative has to be preferred-Whereas that
construction which renders the Statute ultra vires or unconstitutional has to be
rejected.
Words & Phrases :
"Divorce wonwn": and "iddat period"-Meaning of-In the context of
S.2( a) o.f the Muslim Woman (Protection o.f Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.
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"Maintenance:, "provision" and "mahr"-Meaning of-In the context
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2001] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
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of S.3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.
The Petitioners filed a writ petition before this Court challenging the
constitutional validity of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on
Divorce) Act, 1986.
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On behalf of the petitioners it was contended that the Act was un-
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Islamic, unconstitutional and it undermined the secular character which
was the basic feature of the Constitution; that there was no rhyme or
reason to deprive the Muslim women from the applicability of Section 125
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and consequently the Act must be
held to be discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution.
On behalf of the respondents it was contended that a reasonable and
fair.provision and maintenance for the divorced Muslim woman had been
provided under Section 3 of the Act; that personal law was a legitimate
basis for discrimination; that the Act was good enough to take care of the
vagrancy of Muslim divorced woman; that the interpretation of the Act
should be in consonance with the Muslim Personal Law; that the social
ethos of the Muslims should be borne in min.d while interpreting the Act;
that the Act resolved all issues and, therefore, the Act was not invalid or
unconstitutional.•
Dismissing the petition, the Court
HELD : 1. In interpreting the provisions where matrimonial
relationship is involved, one has to consider the social conditions prevalent
in the Indian society. In Indian society, whether one belongs to the majority
or the minority group, what is apparent is that there exists a great disparity
in the matter of economic resourcefulness between a man and a woman.
· Indian society is male dominated both economically and socially and women
are assigned, invariably, a dependent role, irrespective of the class of
society to which she belongs. A woman on her marriage very often, though
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highly educated, gives up her all other avocations and entirely devotes
herself to the welfare of the family, in particular she shares with her
husband, her emotions, sentiments, mind and body , and her investment in
the marriage is her entire life - a sacramental sacrifice of her individual
self and is far too enormous to be measured in terms of money. When a
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relationship of this nature breaks up, in what manner one could compensate ·
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DANIAL LATIF! v. U.0.1.
421
her so far as emotional fracture or loss of investment is concerned, there
can be no answer,. It is a small solace to say that such a woman should be
compensated in terms of money towards her livehood and such a relief
which partakes basic human rights to secure gender and social justice is
universally recognised by persons belonging to all religiExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.