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DANI WOOLTEX CORPORATION & ORS. versus SHEIL PROPERTIES PVT. LTD. & ANR.

Citation: [2024] 6 S.C.R. 761 · Decided: 16-05-2024 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ABHAY S. OKA · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

* Author
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 761 : 2024 INSC 433
Dani Wooltex Corporation & Ors. 
v. 
Sheil Properties Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 6462 of 2024)
16 May 2024
[Abhay S. Oka* and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
When can the power under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 
32 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 be exercised; Is it 
the Arbitral Tribunal’s duty to fix a meeting for hearing; Whether the 
failure of the claimant to request the Arbitral Tribunal to fix a date 
for hearing, per se, is the ground to conclude that the proceedings 
have become unnecessary; Whether abandonment of claim by a 
claimant can be a ground to invoke clause (c) of sub-section (2) 
of section 32.
Headnotes
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Clause (c) of sub-
section (2) of section 32 – When can the power under clause 
(c) of sub-section (2) of section 32 of the Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act, 1996 be exercised:
Held: The power under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 32 
of the Arbitration Act can be exercised only if, for some reason, 
the continuation of proceedings has become unnecessary or 
impossible – Unless the Arbitral Tribunal records its satisfaction 
based on the material on record that proceedings have become 
unnecessary or impossible, the power under clause (c) of sub-
section (2) of Section 32 cannot be exercised – If the said power 
is exercised casually, it will defeat the very object of enacting the 
Arbitration Act. [Para 21(a)]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Is it the Arbitral 
Tribunal’s duty to fix a meeting for hearing:
Held: It is the Arbitral Tribunal’s duty to fix a meeting for hearing 
even if parties to the proceedings do not make such a request – It 
is the duty of the Arbitral Tribunal to adjudicate upon the dispute 
referred to it – If, on a date fixed for a meeting/hearing, the parties 
762
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
remain absent without any reasonable cause, the Arbitral Tribunal 
can always take recourse to the relevant provisions of the Arbitration 
Act, such as Section 25. [Para 21(b)]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Whether the failure of 
the claimant to request the Arbitral Tribunal to fix a date for 
hearing, per se, is the ground to conclude that the proceedings 
have become unnecessary:
Held: The failure of the claimant to request the Arbitral Tribunal 
to fix a date for hearing, per se, is no ground to conclude that the 
proceedings have become unnecessary. [Para 21(c)]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Clause (c) of sub-
section (2) of section 32 – Whether abandonment of claim by 
a claimant can be a ground to invoke clause (c) of sub-section 
(2) of section 32:
Held: The abandonment of the claim by a claimant can be a 
ground to invoke clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 32 – The 
abandonment of the claim can be either express or implied – The 
abandonment cannot be readily inferred – There is an implied 
abandonment when admitted or proved facts are so clinching that 
the only inference which can be drawn is of the abandonment – 
Only if the established conduct of a claimant is such that it leads 
only to one conclusion that the claimant has given up his/her claim 
can an inference of abandonment be drawn – Even if it is to be 
implied, there must be convincing circumstances on record which 
lead to an inevitable inference about the abandonment – Only 
because a claimant, after filing his statement of claim, does not 
move the Arbitral Tribunal to fix a date for the hearing, the failure 
of the claimant, per se, will not amount to the abandonment of 
the claim. [Para 21 (d)]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Clause (c) of sub-
section (2) of section 32 – A part of first appellant’s (D) property 
was permitted to be developed by S under Development 
agreement  – A MOU was also executed between the first 
appellant and M, by which first appellant agreed to sell another 
portion of property to M – Dispute arose – A consensus was 
reached between all the three parties to appoint a Arbitrator – 
Arbitral Tribunal had to deal with claims filed by both S 
and M – M’s claim culminated in an award on 06.05.2017 – 
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
763
Dani Wooltex Corporation & Ors. v. Sheil Properties Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.
However, arbitral proceedings based on claim filed by S did 
not proceed – First Appellant filed an application invoking 
the Arbitral Tribunal power under Clause (c) of sub-section 
(2) of section 3

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