LexDANDU LAKSHMI REDDY versus STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
DANDU LAKSHMI REDDY A v. ST A TE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AUGUST 17, 1999 [K .. T. THOMAS AND D.P. MOHAPATRA, JJ.] B Criminal Trial: Dying declaration-Conviction under Sections 302134 /PC based on such dying declaration-Credibility of-Two dying declarations made by the C deceased against the husband and mother-in-law-Material discrepancy between the two dying declarations regarding the context in which deceased caught fire-Evidence of neighbours that two cousins of the deceased brainwashing the deceased in the hospital-Parents of the deceased, deposed that iwo cousins of the deceased had a score to settle with the appellant on D account of a property dispute and were found in confabulation with the deceased at the hospital-Parents also deposing that the deceased was not mentally sound-Held, it would be unsafe to convict any person on the strength of such a fragile and rickety dying declaration-Circumstantial evidence-Evidence Act, 1872-Indian Penal Code, 1860 Sections 302134. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sections 162, 161-/ndian Evidence Act, 1872, Section I 65-Power of the court to ask question to the witness- Section 162 CrPC interdicts the use of any statement recorded under Section E 161 of CrPC except for the limited purpose of contradicting the witness examined in the trial to whom such statement is attributed-Held, it is impermissible for the court to use that statement later even for drawing any F adverse inference regarding the evidence of that witness-What is interdicted by the Parliament in direct terms cannot be obviated in any indirect manner- Jndian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 302134. Appeal-One accused acquitted-Co-accused not preferred appeal- Benefit of decision to be extended to co-accused to avoid miscarriage of G justice. According to the prosecution the appellant caught hold of deceased's hair from behind and mother-in-law of the deceased poured kerosene oil on her and asked the appellant to set her ablaze. Appellant set the deceased on H 535 536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. I S.C.R. A fire. On the screams of the deceased, neighbours flapped her in a blanket and extinguished the fire. Parents of the deceased (PW-7 and PW-8) were informed before she was taken to the hospital. On the same day, deceased gave dying declaration (Ext P-11) to a Judicial Magistrate (PW-12). A Sub- Inspector of Police (PW-19) went to the hospital and recorded the statement of the deceased (Ext P-14) in which she iinplicated her husband and mother- B in-law. There was a material discrepancy between the two dying declarations regarding the context in which deceased caught fire. Ext. P-14 showed that deceased was set on fire when she was lighting a stove for preparing coffee whereas Ext. P-11 showed that deceased was set on fire when she was still sleeping in the morning on the fateful day. During the trial, appellant adopted C the stand that deceased had some mental imbalance and also suicidal tendencies. All neighbours who gave evidence in the case said in one accord that two persons, first cousins of the deceased were brainwashing her at the hospital. The evidence of PW-7 and PW-8, the father and mother of the deceased showed that those two cousins had scores to settle with the appellant on account of a property dispute and that those two were found in confabulation D with the deceased. On these facts the appellant and his mother were convicted of an· offence punishable under Section 302/34 IPC and were sentenced to imprisonment for life by the trial court. High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence. Hence this appeal. E It was contended by the appellant that the traditional assumption that a dying person would not stop to speak falsehood is now sought to be played down on the premise that it is a pedantic notion as the said assumption is fraught with a danger of insulating even a vengeful statement made by a dying person; that at any rate the dying declaration projected by the prosecution in this case would not stand the test of credibility. F Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. There can be a presumption that testimony ofa competent witness given on oath is true, as the opposite party can use the weapon of cross-examination, inter a/ia, for rebutting the presumption. But a dying G declaration is not a deposition in court. It is neither made on oath nor in the presence of an accused. Its credence cannot be tested by cross-examination. Th
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.