LexDAHYABHAI CHHAGANBHAI THAKKER versus STATE OF GUJARAT
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
361
DAHY ABHAI CHHAGANBHAI THAKKER
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT
[K. SUBBA RAO, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.J
Criminal Law-Burden of proof of guilt-Genera! and spe-
cial burdens, if in conflict-Plea of insanity-Mode of proof en-
umerated-Questions under s. 154 of Evidence Act-When court
can permit-Indian Pena! Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), ss. 80, 84,
299-Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), ss. 105, 137, 154.
The appellant was charged with murdering his wife. Before
the Sessions Judge a defence was set up that the appellant was
insane when the incident took place and was not capable of
understanding the nature of his act. The Sessions Judge reject-
ed the plea of insanity and convicted him under s. 302 of the
Indian Penal Code. On appeal the High Court confirmed the
conviction.
He!d-(i) There is no conflict between the general burden to
prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which is always on the
prosecution and which never shifts, and the special burden that
rests on the accused to make out his defence of insanity.
(ii) The doctrine of burden of proof in the context of the
plea of insanity may be stated in the following propositions:
(1). The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused had committed the offence with the requisite 1TH~ns
rea; and the burden of proving that always rests on the prosecu-
tion from the beginning to the end of the trial. (2) There is a
rebuttable presumption that the accused was not insane, when
he committed the crime, in the sense laid down by s. 84 of the
Indian Penal Code: the accused may rebut it by placing before
the court all the relevant evidenc€'-{Jral, documentary or cir-
cumstantial, but the burden of proof upon him is no higher than
that which rests upon a party to civil proceedings. (3) Even if
the accused was not able to establish conclusively that he was
insane at the time he committed the offence, the evidence
placed before the court by the accused or by the prosecution may
raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as regard.~
one or more of the ingredients of the offence, including mens
rea of the accused and in that case the court would be entitled
to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden <if
proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged.
K. M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, [1962) Supp, 1 S.C.R.
567, followed.
Ramhitram v. State. A.I.R. 1956 Nag. 187, disapproved .
. Kamla Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1955 Pat. 209, approved.
H. M. Advocate v. Fraser, (1878)4 Couper 70. referred to.
(iii) The court can permit a person, who calls a witness, to
put questions to him which might be put in cr<>&s-€xamination,
at any stage of the examination of the witness, provided it takes
care to give an opportunity to the accused to cross-examine him
on the answers elicited which do not find place in the examina-
,,
tion-in-chief.
1964
Marchl~
'
'·
362
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
~
Section 137 of the Evidence Act, gives only the three stages
DaAyobliai 0111taga,.. in the examination of a witness, and it has no relevance to the
bliai TWa<
ques~10n whe~ a party calling a witness can be permitted to put
T.
to him quest10ns under s. 154 of the Evidence Act: that is
Stale of Gujaral
governed by the provisions of s. 154 of the said Act, which con-
fers a discretionary power on the court to permit a person who
calls a witness to put any questions to him which might be put
in cross-examination by the adverse party.
Tahsildar Singh v. The State of U.P., 11959] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
875, followed.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
58 of 1962. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated June 27, 1961 of the Gujarat High Court in Crimi-
nal Appeal No. 656I1960.
B. K. Banerjee, for the appellant.
D. R. Prem, 'R. H. Dhebar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for
the respondent.
March 19, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was deliver-
ed by
SUBBA RAO, J.-This appeal raises the question of the
defence of insanity for an offence under s. 302 of the Indian
Penal Code.
The appellant was the husband of the deceased Kalavati.
She was married to the appellant in the year 1958. On the
night of April 9, 1959, as usual, the appellant and his wife
slept in their bed-room and the doors leading to that room
were bolted from inside. At about 3 or 3.30 a.m. on the next
day Kalavati cried that she was being killed. The neighbours
collectedExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.