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DAFEDAR NIRANJAN SINGH AND ANOTHER versus CUSTODIAN, EVACUEE PROPERTY (PB.) AND ANOTHER

Citation: [1962] 1 S.C.R. 214 · Decided: 08-03-1961 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. SUBBA RAO · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

March 8. 
214 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1962] 
DAFEDAR NIRANJAN SINGH AND ANOTHER 
CUSTODIAN, 
v. 
EVACUEE PROPERTY (PB.) AND 
ANOTHER. 
(K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL and 
J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.) 
Evacuee 
Property-Custodian-Power of revision-Patiala 
Evacuees (Administration of Property) Ordinance of Samvat 2004 
(No. IX of 2004)-Patiala and East Punjab States Union Ordi-
nance No. XIII of Samvat 2&06-Patiala and East Punjab State 
Union Ordinance No. XV II of 2006-Central Ordinance No. 
XXV II of r949-Administration of Evacuee Property Act (No. 
XXXI of r950) ss. 27 and 58(3). 
The Custodian of Evacuee Property, Patiala, took posses-
sion of two houses under the provisions of the Patiala Evacuees 
(Administration of Property) Ordinance of Samvat 2004 (No. IX 
of 2004) but on the appellant claiming the houses as belonging to 
him they were released in his favour by the Custodian by an 
order dated June 6, r949. Thereafter several Ordinances relat-
ing to evacuee property were passed one after another, the later 
one repealing the previous one and creating a chain of fictions 
by which certain provisions of the repealed Ordinance were 
deemed to continue under the repealing Ordinance. The last 
Ordinance was replaced by the Administration of Evacuee Pro-
perty Act (No. XXXI of r950) under the provisions of which the 
Deputy Custodian General set aside the order of Custodian dated 
June 6, r949, after giving notice to the present appellants. On 
appeal by special leave the appellants contended that (r) the 
deeming 
provisions of the repealing Ordinances and Acts 
culminating in s. 58(3) of the Act apply only to things or action 
taken by the Custodian in exercise of his administrative powers 
and not to orders made by him in exercise of his judicial powers, 
(2) the order dated June 6, -.:949 passed by the Custodian under 
Ordinance IX of 2004 could not be deemed to be an order passed 
under the Act as the chain of fictions was broken when Ordi-
nance No. XIII of 2006, repealing the previous Ordinance IX of 
2004 was issued, (3) s. 58 (3) of the Act expressly saves the pre-
vious operation of Ordinance XXVII of r949 or any correspond-
ing law, and, therefore, the orders that had become final under 
the said Ordinance could not be revised under s. 27 of the Act. 
Held, that the operation of s. 58(3) of the Administration 
of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (No. XXXI of r950) was not 
confined only to administrative acts done by the Custodian under 
the earlier Ordinances but the provisions of that section applied 
also to judicial orders passed by him. 
' .. 
.t 
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS 
215 
Indira Sohan Lal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi, 
1961 
[ 1955] 2 S.C.R. III], followed. 
The order dated June 6, 1949, releasing the property in dis-D~fedar Niranjan 
pute was passed under Ordinance No. IX of 2004 by the Custodian Singh 6 Another 
and not the Claims Officer as provided in the successive Ordi-
v. 
nance No. XIII of 2006 and therefore that order could not be 
Custodian. 
deemed to have been passed under the successive Ordinances Evacuee Prop1tty 
and the Act. 
The alleged chain of fiction was broken during the 
(Pb.) 6 Another 
period when Ordinance No. XIII of 2006 was in force. 
Even if 
the Custodian was the Claims Officer, his order must be deemed 
to be an order made under the later Ordinance only for the 
limited purpose of appeal or revisions. 
Under s. 25 of the last 
Ordinance namely Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949 the order of 
the Custodian was appealable but no appeal having been filed it 
had become final under s. 28. 
The order of the Custodian which 
had become final under the said Ordinance, could not be affected 
retrospectively under s. 58(3) of the Act so as to deprive the 
order of the Custodian of the finality it had acquired under the 
said Ordinance. Section 58(3) does not contain any positive 
indication giving it such retroactivity but in express terms it 
saves the previous operation of that Ordinance. 
Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving, (1905) A. C. 69, 
followed. 
Indira Sohan Lal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property. Delhi, 
[1955] 2 S.C.R. n17, considered. 
Delhi Cloth and General Mills v. Income-tax Commissioner, 
Delhi, (1927) I.L.R. 9 Lah. 284, referred to. 
]anki Prasad v. The Custodian Evacuee Property, ]ullundur, 
(1955) I.L.R. 8 Punj. 823, disapproved. 
The words "any time" or "any Custodian" in s. 27 of the 
Act must necessarily be confined only to orders of any one

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