LexD. S. GAREWAL versus THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER
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December Ir. 792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959) Supp. D. S. GAREWAL v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER s. R. DAS, c. J., s. K. DAS, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.) All-India Services-Act passed by provisional Parliament- Constitutionrd validity-Prepidents' power of adaptation-Parliament, if authorised to delegate power to Central Government-Rules, validi- ty of-Institution of enquiry-Competence of the State Government-. All-India Services Act (LXI of r95I), ss, 3, 4-All-India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, r. 5-Constitution of India, Arts. 3I2, 392. The point for determination in this appeal was whether the All India Services Act, (LXI of 1951), enacted by the provisional Parliament, was a constitutionally valid legislation. As there was only one House during the transitional period, the President in exercise of his powers under Art. 392 of the Constitution passed the Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order No. II, on January 26, 1950, and made, amongst others, an adaptation of Art. 312(1) omitting the following therefrom,-" XXX if the Council of States has declared by resolution supported by not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting that it is necessary or expedient in the national interest to do so XXX ". The appellant, who was appointed to the Indian Police Service in 1949, held the post of Superintendent of Police in the Punjab in 1957 when he was reverted as Assistant Superintendent of Police and informed that action was proposed to be taken against him under r. 5 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, framed under s. 3 of the All India Services Act, (LXI of 1951). He was, thereafter, placed under suspension and an Officer was directed to hold a departmental enquiry against him. On receipt of notice of the said enquiry, he moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and challenged the constitutional validity of the Act and the legality of the enquiry. The High Court held against him alld hence this appeal. It was contended on behalf of the appellant, (1) that the President had exceeded his power under Art. 392 in amend- ing Art. 312 in the way he did; (2) that the provisional Parlia- ment was incompetent to enact the impugned Act as there was no compliance with the condition precedent to such an Act being passed under Art. 312 ; (3) that the Rules were repugnant to Art. 312 as they were made at a time when the adaptation was no longer in force; (4) that the Parliament h~d no authority to delegate its function under Art. 312 to the Central G;overnment ; (5) that, at any rate, s. 3 of the Act was vitiated by excessive delegation and (6) that the Punjab Government had no authority under the Rules to institute the proceedings. (1) S.C.R. SUPREJVIE COURT REPORTS 793 Held, that the confontions were all without substance and r958 must be rejected. The power given to the President by Art. 392 of the Con- D.S. Garewal stitution was wide enough to enable him to make any adapta- v. tion by way of modification, addition or omission he considered The State of necessary or expedient with respect to a particular Article and Punjab & Another if he did so in one way and not the other, it could not be said that he had exceeded his power. As the adaptation of Art. 312 by omission of the condition precedent was thus valid, no question of any compliance with it could arise and the provisio- nal Parliament was quite competent to pass the impugned Act. Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar, [1952] S.C.R. 89, held inapplicable. The reappearance of the omitted part of Art. 312 before the framing of the Rules by the Central Government under the Act, could in no way affect their validity since the Act itself was valid and a permanent measure and the Rules derived their force from the Act. It was well settled that the Legislature was competent to delegate to other authorities the power to frame rules to carry out the purposes of the law made by it. Such delegation could also be made to an executive authority within certain limits. Re The Delhi Laws Act, r9r2, [1951) S.C.R. 747 and Raj- narain Singh v. The Chairman, Patna Administration Committee, Patna, [.1955] I S.C. H.. 290, relied on. Use of such expressions as "Parliament may by law pro- viuc" or "Parliament may by law confer" by the Constitution did not necessarily mean that delegation was whol
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