COTTON CORPORATION OF INDIA versus UNITED INDUSTRIAL BANK

Citation: [1983] 3 S.C.R. 962 · Decided: 19-09-1983 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: D.A. DESAI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 4 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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COTTON CORPORATION OF INDIA 
v. 
UNITED INDUSTRIAL BANK 
September 19, 1983 
(D. A. DESAI AND V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI, JJ.] 
Specific Relief Act. 1963-S. 41(b)-Whether court has jurisdiction' t• 
trant injunction restraining any person from 
in~tituting any proceeding in a court 
not iubo!dinate to that from which injunction is sought? 
A Branch Manager of the respondent-Bank C(_)·accepted 16 usance bills 
of the aggregate value of over Rs. 45 lakhs relating lo purchases of cotton made 
by a textile mill from the appellant-Corporation. When the usaii.ce bi,lls 
inatured, the Corporation called upon the Bank to make payn1ent. The Bank 
filed a suit against the Corporation praying inter alia for a declai"ation that 
the co-acceptance of the usance bills by its Branch Manager was null and void 
as he did not have the requisite authority to co-accept the bills on beha1 f of 
the Bank and alsO for an interim injunction restraining the Corporation from 
presenting a winding-up petition under the Companies_Act, 1956. 
Th.e prayer 
for injunction was turned down by a Single Judge of the High Court but the 
same was granted by a Division Bench which heard the appeal agains·t the 
order of the Sjngle Judge. The narrow question examined in this appeal was: · 
Whether in view of the provision contained in s. 41(b) of the Specific Relief 
Act, 1963, the court will have jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining 
any person from instituting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to that" 
ftom which the injunction is sought ? 
Allowing the appeal, 
HELD: From the language used ins. 56(b) of the Specific Relier Act, 
1887 (which was the predecessor provision of s. 4I(b) of the 1963 Act) it was 
clear that the court could not stay a proceeding in a court superior in hier-
3.rchy to the court from .which injUnction waS sought; but by a process of 
judicial interpretation a consensus had been reached that a court could bY an 
,injunction restrain a party befo_re it_ from .further prosecuting the proceeding 
in other courts, superior or inferior. To some extent this approach had not 
only effectively circumvented the provision contained in s. 56(b) of the repealed 
Act but also denuded- it of its content The legislature took notice of this 
judicial interpretation and materia1ly altered the language of the succeeding 
Provision. It manifestly expressed its mind by enacting s. 4l(b) in such clear 
and on-ambiguous language that an injunction cannot be granted to restrain 
8.ny person-the language takes care of injunction acting in personum-from 
instituting or prosecuting any procee4ing in a .Court not subordinate to that 
from which injunction is sought. This change in language deliberately adopted 
~y the legislature has to be given full effect. 
[970 F-H; 971 A-B; DJ 
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CoTTON CORPN, V, U.1. BANK 
963 
(i) Anyone having a right, that is a legally protected interest, complains 
of its infringement and seeks relief through Court must have an unhindered, 
uninterrupted access to Jaw courts. Access to court in search of justice 
according to Jaw is the right of a person who complains of infringement of 
his legally protected interest and a fortiori therefor~. no other court can by its· 
actlon impede access to justice. This principle is deducible from the Consti· 
tution which see~s to set up a society governed by rule of law. As a corollary 
it must yield to another principle that a superior court can injunct a person by 
restraining him from instituting or prosecuting a proceeding before a subordi· 
nate court. Save this specific carving Out of the area where access to justice 
Iilay be impeded by an injunction of the court, the legislature desired that 
courts ordinarily should not impede access to justice through court. This is 
the equitable principle underlying s. 41(b). Accordingly, it must receive such 
interpretation as would advance the intendment and thwart the mischief it was 
·enacted to supress and to keep the pat_h of access to justice through court 
unobstructed. 
[971 F-H; 972 A-BJ 
(ii) The legal systen1 in our country envisages obtaining redressal of a 
wrong or relief against unju~t denial thereof by approaching the court set up 
for the purpose. If a person complaining of invasion of his rights is injuncted 
from approaching the court set up to grant relief by an action brciught by the 
opposite side against whom he has a clai,n and which he wanted to enforce 
through court, he w

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