CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA versus CALCUTTA TRAMWAYS CO. LTD.
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, I _,. 5 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 25 enquiry about the collection of the amount of Rs. 28,000 1963 and the destination thereof, it was imputed against Bhanwarlal that he had defrauded the agriculturists Mohan Singh and misappropriated the amount collected, the in- v. ference that the statement made was to the knowledge Bhanwarlal of the maker false or was not believed by him to be true, would readily be made. The imputation was Shah J. on the face of it one reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of the candidate Bhanwarlal at the election. The High Court was therefore right in holding that the corrupt practice charged against the appellant Mohan Singh under s. 123 (4) was established. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA v. CALCUTTA TRAMWAYS CO. LTD. (P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO, J.C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.) Constitution of India, Art. 19(1) (g) and (f}-Enactment making 1963 October 4 A .I opinion of Corporation conclusive and non-justiciable-If reasonable restriction-Severability-Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 (W.B. Act 33 of 1951), s. 437(1) (b). / The respondent company got its supply of electricity from the Calcutta Electric Supply Co., converted the same from alternate current to direct current in its transformer house for running its tram-cars. The appellant Corporation was of opinion that the use of the premises as transformer house was dangerous to life, health and property and was likely to cause a nuisance and asked the respondent to take a licence under s. 437(1)(b) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. The respondent refused to do so and was therefore prosecuted under s. 537 of the Act. The trial Magistrate held in favour of the appellant and convicted the respondent and ientenced it to pay a fine of Rs. 100 only. The respondent moved 26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] 1963 the High Court in revision. That Court held that the' provision ins. 437(1) (b) which made the opinion the Corporation conclusive Corporation of and non-justiciable unreasonably restricted the fundamental right Calcutta enshrined in Art. 19(1) (g) of the Constitution and since that pro- v. vision was inseverable the entire section was unconstitutional. Calcutta Tram- AThe corporation appealed to this Court. Section 437(l)(b) of the C Ltd ct provided as follows,- ways o., . "( 1) No person shall use or permit or suffer to be used any premises for any of the following purposes without or other- wise than in conformity with the terms of a licence granted by the Commissioner in this behalf, namely,-. (a) (b) any purpose which is, in the opinion of the Corporation (which opinion shall be conclusive and shall not be challenged in any court) dangerous to life, health or property, or likely to create a nuisance.'' Held: The power conferred on the Corporation bys. 437(I)(b) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, in the parenthetical clause "which opinion shall be conclusive and shall not be challenged in any court" which was in the nature of a procedural provision, was an unreasonable restriction within the meaning of Art. 19(6) of the Constitution and must be struck down. The clause makes the opinion of the Corporation, however unreasonable, capricious and arbitrary, conclusive and non-justiciable and thereby places trade and business within the municipal limits entirely at the mercy of the Corporation, even though it may not act ma/a fide. The decision of this Court in Joseph Kuruvilla Ve/lukunnel v. Reserve Bank of India, must be confined to the special circum- stances of the trade of banking and cannot be extended as a matter of course to other cases involving substantially similar provisions and each case should be judged on its own merits. Joseph Kuruvilla Vellukunnel v. The Reserve Bank of India, (1962] Supp .. 3 S.C.R. 632, held inapplicable. So judged in the light of the principles laid down by this Court, the parenthetical clause was severable from the rest of the section and, consequently. that clause a1one, and not t~e entire section should be struck down. The scheme of the section was not so integrated as to indicate that the Legislature wanted it to be opera- tive as a whole. Dr. N.B. Khare v. State of Delhi, [1950] S.C.R. 519 and R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union ~f India, [1957] S.C.R. 930, relied on. ' ยท-~ CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
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