LexCOMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA versus SCHOTT GLASS INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR.
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[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1316 : 2025 INSC 668 Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. (Civil Appeal No. 5843 of 2014) 13 May 2025 [Vikram Nath* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.] Issue for Consideration I. Whether providing exclusionary volume based discounts, imposing contractual terms, refusing supply etc. will amount to abuse of dominant position? II. Whether the functional-discount / “no-Chinese” scheme (including the later TMLA arrangement) imposes unfair or discriminatory conditions under Section 4(2)(a) and Section 4(2)(b) of the Act? III. Whether the LTTSA with Schott Kaisha produced a margin- squeeze proscribed by Section 4(2)(e) of the Act? IV. Whether Schott India tied or bundled NGA and NGC tubes, thereby breaching Section 4(2)(d) of the Act? V. Whether an effects-based (harm) analysis is an essential component of an inquiry under Section 4 of the Act., and, if so, whether it was omitted in the present case? VI. Whether the investigation and the Commission’s order are vitiated by denial of cross-examination and allied breaches of natural justice? Headnotes† Competition Act, 2002 – s.4 – Abuse of Dominance – Whether target-discount scheme of Schott India amounts to discriminatory or exclusionary pricing in contravention of Section 4(2)(a) and Section 4(2)(b) of the Act – The rebate structure applied uniformly to all purchasers based solely on volume thresholds, irrespective of buyer identity – Thus not in contravention of provisions of Competition Act: * Author [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1317 Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Held: It is an undeniable fact that Schott India holds a dominant position in the Neutral Glass Tubing market in India – As per Section 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(b) of the Act, an abuse of dominant position arises only where a dominant enterprise (i) impose unfair or discriminatory prices or conditions, (ii) limit production or technical development, (iii) block others from the market, (iv) force a buyer to accept an unrelated product or obligation, or (v) use power in one market to muscle into, or protect, another – Thus applying different prices only becomes abusive when it lacks an objective commercial justification or when equivalent customers cannot obtain the same terms – The rebate ladder introduced by Schott was directly proportional to the aggregate tonnage of Neutral Glass Clear (“NGC”) and Neutral Glass Amber (“NGA”) collected within the financial year by the customer – Every customer who reached a slab, whether by one purchase order or by several, obtained the corresponding allowance on the entire year’s turnover — The rebate therefore rose mechanically with volume and with nothing else – identity of the buyer was irrelevant – While larger buyers like Schott Kaisha availed higher rebates due to greater offtake, no evidence showed denial of similar rebates to similarly placed customers – Moreover, reliance is placed on the untested declarations of five converters alleging that Schott Kaisha received “special” terms – Those statements, taken ex parte and never subjected to cross-examination, thus cannot be relied upon – Therefore, the target-discount scheme of Schott India is not in contravention of Section 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(b) of the Act. [Paras 10, 31, 33, 38, 39] Competition Act, 2002 – s.4 – Abuse of Dominance – Functional Discount / “No-Chinese” Scheme – Whether Unfair or Discriminatory under Sections 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(b) of the Competition Act, 2002 – the functional rebate and its successor agreements are not unfair or discriminatory as the rebate terms remained consistent across similarly placed converters, with no price discrimination: Held: The uniform 8% functional rebate was granted to converters that met three objective and commercially justifiable conditions: (i) fulfilling a purchase plan to ensure furnace stability; (ii) refraining from using certain Chinese tubing due to quality concerns (a condition later withdrawn); and (iii) complying with traceability and fair-pricing obligations – Each condition is therefore objectively 1318 [2025] 5 S.C.R. Supreme Court Reports connected with the legitimate aim, patient safety and brand integrity, and is proportionate to it – Ledgers for FY 2008-09 to FY 2011-12, collated by COMPAT, discloses no instance in which two converters performing the same function received different net prices – The rebate terms remained co
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