COMMON CAUSE versus UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
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COMMON CAUSE A v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. OCTOBER 8, 2003 [R.C. LAHOTI AND ASHOK BHAN, JJ.] B Delhi Rent Act, 1995-Section 1 (3)-Enforcement of Act-Delhi Rent Bill, 1994 received Presidential assent-Bill enacted as Act and notified- However, Parliament did not fix the date for coming into operation of the Act and left it to the discretion of the Central Government-Writ of C MandΒ΅mus seeking issuance of notification in Official Gazette by Central Government under Section 1 (3) notifying the date for coming into force of the Act-Maintainability of-Held: There were numerous representations from tenant organisations demanding changes in the Delhi Rent Act, 1995 and as such Delhi Rent (Amendment) Bill was drafted and introduced in D Rajya Sabha-Government accepted recommendations of Parliamentary Standing Committee and sent the notice to Rajya Sabha to in~oduce the Amendment Bill-As such the Government was aware of the problem- Hence, the Writ of Mandamus cannot be issued to the Central Government in view of the facts on record-Further, when legislature vested the power in the Central Government to notify the date from which Act would come E into force, Central Government is to take into consideration various facts while considering the same-Delhi Rent (Amendment) :Act Bill, 1997- Constitution of India, 1950-Article 226. Delhi Rent Act, 199 5-Section 1 (3)-Enforcement of Act-Legislature F providing that the date of coming into force of the Act would be a date to be notified by the Central Government-Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, application of-Held : Section 5 has no application to such cases-It cannot be said that by virtue of Section 5, Act of 1995 has come into force-Section 5 is applicable only when the Act does not express arry G date with effect from which the Act would come into force-General Clauses Act, 1897-Section 5. Delhi Rent Bill, 1994 was introduced in the Rajya Sabha on 26.8.1994 and was passed unanimously in the Rajya Sabha and in the Lok Sabha. It received Presidential assent on 23.8.1995 and was H 471 472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201J3] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. A enacted as the Delhi Rent Act, 1995 and notified on 23.8.1995. Parliament did not fix the date with effect from which the Act would / come into operation and it was left to the discretion of the Central Government to notify the date w.e.f. which the Act would come into operation. Central Government did not notify the date. Appellant filed B writ petition seeking writ of mandamus directing the~ Union of India to issue a notification in. the Official Gazette, as contemplated under Section 1(3) of the Act notifying the date for coming into force of the Act. Union of India contended that on account of several representations received from tenant organizations demanding changes in some of the C provisions of the Act and the report of the All Party Committee constituted to examine the same, Delhi Rent (Amendment) Bill, 1997 was drafted. It was introduced in the Rajya Sabha and was referred to the Parliamentary Standing Committee which examined the same and finalized its reports. The Government accepted the D rec.ommendations of the Committee and thereafter, sent the notice to the Secretary-General, Rajya Sabha to introduce the Amendment Bill. However, due to the workload the Bill could not be taken up for consideration in the Rajya Sabha and since the Government wanted to introduce the Amendment Bill of 1997, the Original Act was not notified and as such delayed. It was further submitted that the Court E could not issue a writ of mandamus to the Central Government for the enforcement of the Act. Writ petition came up before the Division Bench of High Court. The Bench issued limited mandamus and the Central Government filed F an affidavit reporting compliance therewith and as such the writ petition was disposed of. Hence the present appeals. Appellant contended that on the President conveying his assent to the Bill, a Bill is lawfully enacted and converts itself into an Act; G and that as neither a particular date has been stipulated by the Parliament in its enforcement nor the Parliament has expressed any contrary intention by the prescription of permitting different dates being stipulated for enforcement of different provisions of the Act, the Act would be deemed to have come. i~to force in terms of provisions H of section 5 of the General Claus~s Act. COMMON CAUSE v. U.O.I. 473 Di
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