COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, JULLUNDUR versus AJANTA ELECTRICALS, PUNJAB

Citation: [1995] 3 S.C.R. 1083 · Decided: 02-05-1995 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: B.P. JEEVAN REDDY · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

r 
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, JULLUNDUR 
A 
v. 
AJANTA ELECTRICALS, PUNJAB 
MAY 2, 1995 
[B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND G.T. NANA VAT!, JJ.) 
B 
Income Tax Act, 1961: 
--' 
Sectio11 139(2)--Proviso (As it stood prior to its deletion on 1.4. I989 )--
Object and inte1pretatio11 of-Income Tax Retum-Extension of time for C 
filin15Applicatio11 filed after expily of stipulated period-Held pem1issible. 
Income Tax Act-Procedural provisiol!S-!nterpretatio11 of-Principle 
of procedure evolved for doing justice can be applied-Code of Civil Proce-
dure, 1908. 
Words a11d Phrases : 'Extend'-Meaning of-Section 139(2)-- D 
Proviso-Income Tax Act, 1961. 
. 
· 
The respondents, a partnership firm and its partners, were issued 
notices under Section 139(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 requiring them 
to me their retnrns within 30 days from the date of issue of notice. E 
However, all of them filed their returns as well as applications for exten-
sion of time for filing the return after the expiry of the dne date. As there 
was delay in filing the returns the Income Tax Officer levied penalty upon 
them. On appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner cancelled the 
penalty imposed upon the firm but upheld the penalty imposed upon the 
partners. The Tribunal allowed the revenue appeals and restored the 
orders passed by the Income Tax Officer. The High Court decided the 
reference iu favour of the assessee by holding that an application for 
extension of time for filing the return can be filed even after the expiry of 
the due date. 
In Revenue's appeal to this Court it was contended that in the 
absence of a specific provision in the Act or Rules made thereunder the 
High Court should have held that the filing of applications for extension 
of time after the expiry of the stipulated period was not permissible. 
Dismissing the appeals, this Court 
1083 
F 
G 
H 
1084 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 
A 
HELD : 1. The applications made by the assessees under Sec-
tion139(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for extension of time after the expiry 
Y' 
of the time allowed were maintainable and, therefore, valid. [1092-G] 
2. If Section 139(2) is read along with Rule 13 and Form No. 6 it 
becomes clear that an application for extension could be made even after 
B the period allowed originally or as a result of extension granted had 
expired. Keeping in mind the object of the Proviso to Section 139(2) giving 
discretion .to the Income Tax Officer and the consequences that were to 
follow from not flling the return with in time, there is no justification for 
reading into the section any limitation to the effect that no application 
C could be made after the time allowed had expired. There is no good reason 
to construe the section so narrowly. If it was intended that the application 
for extension of time under Section 139(2) was to be made within the time 
allowed originally or within the extended time the words "it ha• not been 
possible" were not at all necessary and the words "it is not possible" would 
have been sufficient. (1089-C, Al 
D 
3. For various reasons the Legislature may not make provisions in 
detailes in matters of procedure to be followed. It may rest with conferring 
discretionary power upon the Court or the authority and leave it to the 
Court or that authority to exercise that power in its discretion as deemed 
E proper and just depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 
Whether a particular thing could be done or not in absence of a specific 
provision to that effect would depend upon the object of that provision and 
other relevant factors like the consequences which may follow if it is held 
that it cannot be done. From mere absence of a specific provision authoris-
ing the ITO to entertain an application made beyond time it was not proper 
F to hold that it was not open to the assessee to make an application under 
Section 139(2) for extension of time after the time allowed had expired and 
that such an application could not be entertained by the ITO. [1091-C-D) 
G 
Sunderdas Thackersay & Ors. v. C./. T., 137 ITR 646, approved. 
T., Venkata Krishnaiah and Co. v.• C./. T., ITR 297; C./. T. v. S.P. Viz 
Construction Co., 165 I.T .R. 732 and Assam Frontier Veneer and Saw Mills 
v. C./. T., 104 l.T.R. 479, disapproved. 
4. Revenue's contention that the word 'extend' in the proviso to 
H Section 139(2) implies that at the time of making the application the time 
' "-·· 
C.l.T. v. AIANTAELEcrRICALS [NANAVATI,J.]

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.