COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY CITY versus R.H. PANDI MANAGING TRUSTEES OF TRUST, BOMBAY
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A B c D E F G COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY CITY v. R.H. PANDI MANAGING TRUSTEES OF TRUST, BOMBAY September 4, 974 [A. N. RAY, C.J., K. K. MATiiEW AND Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.] 7 Supreme Cou~t Rules, 1966, 0.6 r.2(14).- Whether Chamber Judge clan d/S- pose of applications for condonaticn of delay in filing petitions of appeal. Order 6, Rule 2(14) provides that the powers of the Court in relation to applicatfons for enlargement or .abridgement of time except where the time is fixed _by the Court or relates to deposit of security and except applications for condonation of delay in filing Special Leave Petitions, may be exercised by a single Judge sitting in Chambers. On the question whether applications for condonation of delay in filing petitions of appeal should be heard only by the Court which can dismiss the appeal and not 'by the Judge, ·in Chambers, because, the refusal of such an application will amount to dismissal of an eppeul by the Judge in Chambers,. HELD : The words 'Enlargement or abridgement of time in 0.6 r. 2(14) of the ·Rules, take in applications for enlargement of time appointed by the Rules. A petition of appeal is required under Order 15 of the Rules to be presented within 60 days from the grant of certificate of fttne&S, and under Order 46, r. 3 of Rules, the Supreme Court, on application may enlarge and abridge the time appointed by these rules for. doing· any act· etc. Therefore, a Chamber Judge may exercise the powers of the Court in relation to. any application for condonation of delay in filing a petition of appeal. In fact, but for the exception in the Rule even applications for condonation of delay In filing special leave · petitions would be Included therein. Further, this Jlractice of the .Chamber Jud~e bearing applications for· condonation of delay in filing petitions of appeal within the time appointed by ·the· Supreme Court Rules has ·been followed ever since 1966. Where a practice has existed it is convenient to adhere to it, because, the practice of the Court is the law of the 'Court. [8H-9C] Cocker v. Tempest 7 M. & W. 502, referred to. CivrL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 895 to .897 of 1973. Appeals from the Judgmen~ & Order dated the 9th April, 1970 of the Bom~y High Court in l.T. Ref. No. 105of1963. Civil Appeals Nos. 898 to 899. of 1973 Appeals from the Judgment & Order dated the 17th/18th March, 1970 of the Bombay High Court in !·T. Ref. No. 94 of 1963. Civil Appeal No. 2054 of 1971. Appeal from the judgment & Decree dated the 14th September, 1969 of the Madras High Court in Appeal No. 435 of 1962. F. S. Nariman, Addi. Solicitor General, .and R. N. Sachthe)I, for H the appellants (In CAs. Nos. 895-899/73) and for Attroney General. ·. A. V. Ran~ and A. Subhashini, for the appellant (In CA. No. 2054/71). . . . 8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1975] 2 s.c.R. P. C. Bhartari K. J. Johsn and J. B. Dadachanji, for the respon- dents (In CAs. Nos. 895-899). V. Sriniw.san & Lily Thomas, for respondent No. 2 (In CA. No. 2054/71). A. K .. Sen, and Janardan Sharma, for Sup. Ct. Bar Assn. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY, C. J.-In these matters a question arises as to whether appli- cations for condonation of delay in fi1lna petition ol oppeal can b heard by the Judge in Chambers. An argument is advanced before the Hon'ble Judge in Chambers that if an application for condonation of delay is refused by the Judge in Chambers it will amount to dis· missal of the appeal by the Juage in Chambers. Therefore, it is said that these applications should be heard by the Court which alone can dismiss an appeal. · Noticen were given to the Attorney General and th: Bar Asso· ciation because it was said. that ¢e existing practi~ of posting appli- cations for condonation of delay in filing petition of appeal before the Judge in Ch!IDlbers should be discontinued and such applications should be listed before the Court. The relevant rule is Order VI Rule 2(14) of the Supreme Court Rules. Order VI Rule . 2 states that the powers of the Court in rela- tion to matters enumerated there m~y be exercised by a Single Judge sitting in Chambers. Oauie (14) reads "Applications for enlarge· ment or abridgement of time except where the time is fixed by tqe Court or relates to deposit of security and except applications for con- donation of delay in filin$ special leave petitions". Under the Rules it follows that all
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