LexCOMMISSIONER-OF INCOME-TAX, ANDHRA PRADESH versus T. N. ARAVINDA REDDY
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; 872 '\. A COMMISSIONER-OF INCOME-TAX, ANDHRA PRADESH B c ( v. T. N. ARA VINDA REDDY . October 5, 1979 [V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.] / ' ' t'l Income-tax .A:ct-1961 Section 54(1)~cope of-Words & Phrase~-Purclzase .) ... . -Meaning of. · ' 1 ~ The te!pondent sold his house at a price sufficient to attract capital gains,. but he~ pre-empted the demand of tax by acquiring the common house from hiS brothers for a consideration of b. 30,000/- each through ~eparate release t'~~s. On behalf of the Petitioner, it was contended that release deeds by sl' ··-B in favour of one of them amounts to purchase within the meaning of , \> of the Act. The High Court having held it is, the Revenue came 1 1 of Special Leave • . :.Jissing the Petition. :.0 : Each release i~ a transfer of the releaser's share for consideration releasee. ·. In plain English, the transferee purchases the shue of each brothers· for a price. Had thls b'~en taken from non-fraternal owners ~s or from one stranger owner, plain spoken people would have called ··chase. The reason i9 ~upported by decision in Hobshaw Brothers Ltd. r, [1956(3) AER 833 and 835] that purchase primarily means acquisi~ money paid, not adjusted. .There is no reason to divorce the ordinary of. the word 'purc~ase'- as buying for a price or equivalent of price 1ent in kind or adjustment towards an old debt or for oth'er monetary 1tion from the legal meaning of that word in s. 54(1) of the Act. )] rL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petiticm. (Civil) 57 of 1979. ~ n the Judgment und Order dated 1-2-1978 of the Andlira Pra-, gh Court in Case Referred No. 114 of 1976. J. Sorabji, Solicitor General and Miss A. Subhashini for the r. Desai, K. J. John and A. K. Verma for the Respondent. Order of the Court was delivered by INA IYER, J-We regard the single point, persuasively pre- . r the learned Solicitor. General on behalf of the petitioner nmissioner of Income Tax,· Andhra Pradesh), as deserving cin~ order, although in dissent; since the question may arise · needs to be silenced. · .. •. 1\' •• i... ; " ! -----··--- ......--~ . C. I. T. v. T. N. A. REDDY (Krishna [yer, 1.) . 873 Briefly, the facts. Four brothers, members of a coparcenary, partitioned their family properties, leaving' in common a large house in the occupation of their· moth~r. The eldest, who is respondent before us, sold his own house at a price sufficient to attract handsome capital gains tax, but he pre--empted the demand for tax by acquiring the common house from his three brothers who executed three release ~/deeds for a consideration of Rs. 30,000/- each, adjusted towards the extra share (/esh#abhaga) agreed to be given to the eldest by the next three. It is common ground that if these release deeds did amount to purchase of the house, s. 54(1) of the Income Tax A~t,- ~ .. J 961~ would save the respondent from exigibility to tax~ So the short question, neatly identified. by the learned Solicitor General is whether rekase deeds by sharers in favour of one of them whereby the joint oWnership of all became separate ownership of one amount to pur- chase of house property within the m~aning of s. 54(1)' of the Act. The High Court has-held it is and we concur. Undoubtedly, each release, in these circumstances, is a transfer of the releaser's share for consideration to the release. In plain English, the transferee pur-. chases the share of each of ·his brothers. It is for a price of Rs. 30,000/- each. Had this been taken from non-fraternal owners of shares or"from one stranger-owner, plain-spoken people would have · called it a purchase. \Vhy; ~hen,. shoul& legalist be allowed to play this linguistic distortion. The reason, supposedly supported by an . English decision, is that purchase primarily means · ·acquisition for money paid, not adjuste:(J. Upjohn,. J. in Hobshaw Brvthers Ltd. v. MayerC) has circumspectly said : ' There are no doubt. to be found authorities and statutes which have extended that meaning. In Mr. T. Cyprian Williams book, the. Contract of Sale of Land, at p. 3 he says: "'sale', in the strkt and primary sen~e of th~ wcrd, 'means' an agreement for the conveyance o( property for a Brice in money; hut the word 'sale' may by used in law in a wider sense and'so applied to the conveyance of land for a price consisting wholly or partly of money's worth other: than the conveyance of some other land."
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