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COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, COCHIN versus M/S. TATA TEA LTD.

Citation: [2002] 3 S.C.R. 730 · Decided: 02-05-2002 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: N. SANTOSH HEGDE · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, COCHIN 
v. 
M/S. TATA TEA LTD. 
MAY2, 2002 
B 
[N. SANTOSH HEGDEAND SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, JJ.] 
Tea Act, 1953-Sections 25 and 3(n)-Imposition of cess on tea 
produced in India- 'Instant tea' manufactured and exported by a tea 
company-Cess-Levy of-Liability-Held, since 'instant tea' is covered by 
C definition of tea within the meaning of Section 3(n), cess can be levied on 
it. 
D 
Interpretation of Statutes-When Act specifically provides for a definition 
of a term, there is no need to refer to other enactments. 
Respondent, engaged in the manufacture of 'instant tea', was issued 
notices as to why on 'instant tea' cleared by them cess should not be levied 
under Section 25 of the Tea Act, 1953. Respondent submitted that 'instant tea' 
was not 'tea' falling within the definition of Section 3(n) of the Act and thus 
the notices were illegal. Assistant Commissioner held that cess could be levied. 
E Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the same. However, Tribunal referring to 
Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 and the Tea Waste (Control) 
Order, 1959 held that 'instant tea' cannot be considered as 'tea' within the 
meaning of Section (3)n of the Act, thus cess could be levied. 
In appeal before this Court appellant contended that the term 'tea' for 
F levy of cess has to be interpreted on the basis of the definition of 'tea' given in 
the Act and not on the basis of definitions given in the Preventioq of Food 
Adulteration Rules, 1955 and the Tea Waste (Control) Order, 1959; that 
'instant tea' is variety of tea and it is commercially known and sold in the 
market as 'instant tea'; and that there was no fprther need to go into the 
G manner of manufacture and preparation of 'instant tea' and the tribunal 
misdirected itself in concluding that 'instant tea' is not 'tea' by referring to 
other enactments. 
Respondent submitted that 'instant tea' has a different identity and it is 
differently known in the market and hence it does not fall within the definition 
II 
730 
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COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE v. TATA TEA LTD. [SHIVARAJ V PATIL,J.l 73J 
of 'tea' under the Act. 
Allowing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1.1. In order to satisfy the definition of 'tea' under Section 3(n) 
of the Tea Act, 1953 a product should be commercially known as tea and it 
should be made from the leaves of the plant of Camellia Sinensis (L) 0. Kuntze. 
'Instant tea' satisfies both these conditions. It conveys that it is a 'tea.' The 
term 'instant tea' is not the brand name of the product manufactured by the 
assessee but the name of the product itself. It is a variety of tea. Further, the 
term 'instant tea' gives a meaning that it is a 'tea', which can be prepared/ 
used instantaneously. Merely because the product is known as 'instant tea', it 
does not cease to be known commercially as 'tea'. The manner of preparation 
of tea and the process of manufacture of 'instant tea' powder cannot take away 
'instant tea' out of definition of'tea' under the Act. Thus, the 'instant tea' 
falls within the definition of Section 3(n) and cess can be levied on i( under 
Section 25 of the Act.1753-F-H; 734-A, BJ 
โ€ข 
1.2. Commissioner (Appeals) was right in upholding the Order of the 
Assistant Commissioner but the Tribunal went wrong in holding that 'instant 
tea' is different from 'tea' and it fell outside the scope of Section 3(n) of the 
Act. When the Act defined 'tea' specifically, the tribunal ought not to have 
strained itself by referring to other enactments to construe 'instant tea' as 
the product not included within the definition of 'tea' under the Act.1734-B-CJ 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1515-1517 of 
1999, 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
From the Judgment and Order dated J 7. 7 .1998 of the Customs Excise p 
โ€ข 
J> 
and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, South Zonal Bench at Chennai in 
A.No. E/358, 361 & 362/98 in F.O. No. 1352-1354 of 1998. 
Soli J. Sorabjee, Attorney General, Rajiv Nanda and 8.K. Prasad for the 
Appellant. 
Anil 8. Diwan, Joy Joseph and R.8. Hathikhanwala for the Respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
SHIV ARAJ V. PATIL, J. The short question that arises for consideration 
G 
is whether 'instant tea' manufactured and exported by the respondent is liable H 
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A 
B 
c 
ยทn 
E 
F 
G 
732 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2002] 3 S.C.R. 
for levy of cess under Section 25 of the Tea Act, 1953. 
The respondent is engaged in the manufacture of 'instant tea'. 

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