COMMISSIONER, LUCKNOW DIVISION AND ORS. versus KUMARI PREM LATA MISRA
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( 957 COMMISSIONER, LUCKNOW DIVISION AND ORS. A I v. KUMARI PREM LATA MISRA October 26, 1976 (Y. V. CHAN!)RACHUD, P. K. GOSWAMI AND A. C. GUPTA, JJ.] U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921,-Whether the basic section of a college is within the scope of. The respondent, an assistant teacher in the basic section of the Colvin Taluqdll.r's c0llege, Lucknow, was suspended and then removed from service, by the managing committee of the college. She filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging her dismissal order, contending that it violated the regulatio-. framed under the (U.P.) Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The appellants contended that the college was rulllling the basic Section in- dependently and without any affiliation or grants from the Government or any local body, and that the said Act did not apply. The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the Writ petition as none of the opposite parties was a public authority. An appeal was allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court on the ground that the basic Section was an integral part of the college and was run by a Managing Committee consti- tuted under the Intermediate Education Act. Allowing the appeal the Court, HELD : The provisions of the Act relate to recognized institutions; recog- nition is by the Board for the purpose of preparing candidates for admission to the Board's examination; Board means the Board of High School and Intermediate Education. The basic section of a college cannot therefore be part of a recognised institution. It is not correct to think that since Section l 6A of the Act requires a college to have a committee of management, a managing committee that looks after the affairs of the basic section of the college must also be functioning as a statutory body discharging duties under the Act and governed by the regulatio:1.1s framed thereunder. An institution by extending its operation to fields beyond that covered by the Act cannot extend the ambit of the Act to include in its sweep, these new fields of educa- tion which are outside its scope. [959 C-GJ CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 343 of 1974. (Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order 11-9-1973 of the Allahabad High! Court (Lucknow Bench) Appeal No. 118/71). D. Mukherjee and C. P. Lal for the appellant. dated in Spl. Akhtar Ilussain,.S. N. Prasad and D. N. Misra, for the Respon- .dents. ~ The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GUPTA J.-Colvin Taluqdars' College in Lucknow, run by a ·society registered under the Societies Registration Aet, imparts educa- tion at the following different stages : (i) Pre-basic i.e., nursery classes. (ii) Junior basic, called primary stage, from class I to V. (iii) Senior basic i.e., Junior high school stage from class VI to VIII, and B c D E F G H A B c D E F G H 958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1977) 1 S.C.R. (iv) Higher secondary st~ge, called high school stage·- classes IX and X. (b) Intermediate stage-Classes XI and XII In the beginning the college had no pre-basic or junior basic classes. and started with class VI; classes I to V and nursery classes were opened later. The respondent was appointed an assistant teacher in the basic section of the college in 1961. Following certain incidents involving her, she was suspended on or about August 20, 1970 and ultimately her services were terminated by the managing committee of the college some time in October 1970. She filed a writ ~titian in the High Court at Allahabad (Luc/mow Bench) alleging inter alia that the order terminating her services was mala fide and made in violation of the regulations framed under the (U.P.) Int~mediate Education Act, 1921. §he asked for a writ of certiorari quashing the order of suspension and the order terminating her services, and a writ of mandamus directing the opposite parties to pay the ful1 salary and emoluments due to her. The president of the managing commi- ttee of the college, the principal, the head mistress of the basic section and the committee of management were impleaded as opposite parties 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. The writ petition was dismissed by a single Judge of the High Court on a preliminary ground that none of the opposite parties was a public authority and the impugned orders suspending her and terminating her services were not made in the exercise of any statutory function. On appeal a Division Bench of the H
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