COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, MADRAS versus STANDARD MOTOR PRODUCTS, ETC.

Citation: [1989] 1 S.C.R. 824 · Decided: 24-02-1989 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SABYASACHI MUKHERJI · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, MADRAS 
).-
A 
v. 
STANDARD MOTOR PRODUCTS, ETC. 
FEBRUARY 24, 1989 
B 
[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, S. NATARAJAN AND 
M.H. KANIA, JJ.J 
.
Supreme Court Rules, 1966-0rder VI, Rule 2( 14)-Applications 't-> 
for condonation of delay-Whether Single Judge in Chambers has 
jurisdiction to dismiss-Whether such practice just, fair and reason-
c able-Whether requires to be disturbed-Exception in favour of appli-
cations under Art. 136 of the Constitution-Whether violative of Art. 14 
of the Constitution-Whether they form a separate and distinct class- "' 
Different procedure for different applications-Whether violative of 
fundamental rights-Arranging the business of the Court-Whether 
within the domain of the Court. 
D 
Constitution of India, 1950: Arts. 136 and 137-Applications for 
condonation of delay-Whether a separate and distinct class-Long-
standing and settled practice of the Court-Whether can be disturbed. 
~ 
An application for condonation of delay was filed by the peti-
E tioner-Revenue alongwith statutory appeals against the judgment/order 
of the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal. The 
application was rejected by a Single Judge of this Court under Order 
VI, Rule 2(14) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966. 
·--i 
The Revenue filed review petitions on the ground that the applica-
i 
F 
tion for condonation of delay made in statutory appeals under several 
l 
Acts should be heard by a bench of at least two Judges. It was con-
tended that the effect of the refusal of condonation of delay was dismis-
sal of the appeal itself, that the exception in favour of Special Leave 
Petitions amounted to hostile discrimination without any basis in that 
the Special Leave Petitions will be amenable to be dealt with by two 
G 
Judges, while a Single ..ludge will dispose of applications for condona-
lion of delay under statutory appeals, which was irrational and violative \ 
of Art. 14 of the Constitution and, therefore, the Court should either 
hold that as dismissal of application for condonation of delay amounted 
to dismissal of the appeal itself, it should be heard by not less than two 
' 
Judges in terms of Order VII Rule 1 subject to other provisions or refer 
H the matter to a larger bench for re-consideration, in view of the decision 
.. 
824 
.,_ 
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)t 
-'-
-
JI 
_,,., 
COLLECTOR OF C.E. v. MOTOR PRODUCTS 
825 
of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Bombay City versus R.H. 
Pandi, Managing Trustees of Trust. Bombay, holding that the applica-
tions for condonation of filing petitions of appeal were within the 
Chamber business under Order VI Rule 2(14). 
On the question whether a Single Judge has jurisdiction to dismiss 
applications for condunation of delay In statutory appeals. 
Dismissing the review petitions, 
HELD: I.I A Single Judge in Chambers is and was always com-
petent to dismiss all applications for condonation of delay .in statutory 
appeals. There is nothing repugnant in the same that it is not violative 
of Art. 14 of the Constitution. [836G] 
1.2 Order VI, Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules provides that 
the powers of the court in relation to a certain matters may be exercised 
by a Single Judge sitting in Chambers. Rule 2(14) deals with applica-
tions for enlargement or abridgement of time with some exceptions. 
Reading the rule simply, it means all applications for enlargement or 
abridgement of time would be cognizable by the Single Judge in Cham-
hers except those applications, time for which is fixed by the court in 
terms of Order VII and also applications for condonation of delay in 
filing Special Leave Petitions. [83IE-F] 
1.3 On a proper reading, the exception made only in favour of the 
time fixed by the court means court functioning judicially in terms of 
Order VII Rule 1 as well as time fixed by the rules of the court. All other 
applications for enlargement or abridgement for time could be heard by 
the Single Judge. [831F-G] 
1.4 If a separate and distinct provision is made for application for 
condonatlon of delay under Art. 136 of the Constitution, it is not viola-
tive of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Applications under Art. 136 are a 
special class and are sui juris. These are and should legitimately be 
treated separately other than all other applications including applica-
tions under statutory appeals. Art. 136 is the residuary power of this 
Court to do justice, where the court is satisfied that there is injustice. 
These are class part.

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