COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION, ANANTNAG & ANR. versus MST. KATIJI & ORS.

Citation: [1987] 2 S.C.R. 387 · Decided: 19-02-1987 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M.P. THAKKAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 11 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION, ANANTNAG & ANR, 
V, 
MST. KATJJI & ORS. 
FEBRUARY 19, 1987 
[M.P, THAKKAR AND B.C. RAY, JJ,] 
Indian Limitation Act, 1963; s,5-Condoning delay in filing 
appeal-Existence of 'sufficient cause'-Determination of-State seek-
ing condonation of delay-To be treated equitably, 
An appeal by the State, against a decision enhancing compensa-
tion in respect of acquisition of lands for a public purpose, raising 
important questions as regards principles of valuation, was dismissed 
by the High Court as time barred, being four days beyond time, by 
rejecting an application for condonation of dalay. 
The State appealed to this Court by special leave. 
Allowing the appeal, 
HLED: 1.1 The expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the 
legislature in s.5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately elastic 
A 
B 
c 
D 
to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of 
E 
matters on merits. [388E-F] 
1.2 The State which represents the collective cause of the community, 
does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The doctrine of equality 
before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, 
are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an 
F 
equitable manner. The Courts, therefore, have to be informed with the 
spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation 
of the expression 'sufficient cause'. So also the same approach has to be 
evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do 
even handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which 
scuttles a decision on merits. [390B·C] 
G 
2. In the instant case, sufficient cause exists for delay in institut-
ing the appeal in the High Court. Delay is, therefore, condoned. The 
matter is remitted to the High Conrt for disposal on merits. [390C-D I 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No, 460 H 
-
of 1987. 
387 
:~ 
388 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.4. 1986 of the Jammu & 
A and Kashmir High Court in Civil 1st Appeal No. 54 of 1985. 
Altaf Anjad, Adv. General and S.K. Bhattacharya for the 
Appellants. 
B 
S.M. Aquil and Shakeel Ahmed for the Respondents. 
c 
The Order of the Court was delivered by 
THAKKAR, J. To condone, or not to condone, is not the only 
question. Whether or not to apply the same standard in applying the 
"sufficient cause" test to all the litigants regardless of their personality 
in the said context is another. 
An appeal preferred by the State of Jammu & Kashmir arising 
out of a decision enhancing compensation in respect of acquisition of 
lands for a public purpose to the extent of nearly 14 lakhs rupees by 
D 
making an upward revision of the order of 800% (from Rs.1000 per 
kanal to Rs.8000 per kanal) which also raised important questions as 
regards principles of valuation was dismissed as time barred being 4 
-"'-
days beyond time by rejecting an application for condonation of delay. 
·+ ·-_
Hence this appeal by special leave. 
E 
The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by 
enacting Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to 
enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of 
matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the 
legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in 
F 
a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice-that being 
the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is 
common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably 
liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message 
does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the 
hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is 
G realized that:-
I. "Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provi-
sions of o;der XX.I of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the 
prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had 
sufficiet1t cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such 
H 
period." 
' 
-
ANANTNAG v. MST. KATJI [THAKKAR, J.] 
389 
I. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging 
an appeal late. 
A 
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious 
matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause 
of justice being defeated. As against this when delay

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