LexaceLexace Ask the AI ›
⚖️ Ask the AI about your situation:🚗 Car Accident💼 Work / Job🏠 Housing / Eviction👪 Family / Divorce📋 Contract Dispute💰 Money Owed

COLLECTOR' CENTRAL EXCISE, BOMBAY versus M/S. S.D. FINE CHEMICALS PVT. LTD.

Citation: [1995] 3 S.C.R. 84 · Decided: 30-03-1995 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: B.P. JEEVAN REDDY · Disposal: Disposed off

cites 2 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
COLLECTOR' CENTRAL EXCISE, BOMBAY 
v. 
MIS. S.D. FINE CHEMICALS PVT. LTD. 
MARCH 30, 1995 
B 
(B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND SUHAS C. SEN, JJ.) 
Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944: 
Section 2(f}-'Manufacture'-Meaning and scope of expression-Held 
C definition is expansive. 
Assessee manufacturing Chemicals and fine chemica/s-{fnde1taking 
process of distillation and recrystallisatiort-Exemption from duty on the 
ground that process undenaken was not manufactt1~ejectivn of claim-
Appeal-Tribunaf-DiJference of opinion between two Membe~eference 
D to third Member-Disposal of issue by third-Member in a cryptic man-
nei--On Revenue's appeal matter remitted to third Member for fresh opinion. 
' 
The respondent was manufacturing laboratory chemicals and fine 
chemicals by employing the process of distillation and recrystallisation. It 
claimed exemption from excise duty, under Notification No. 77 of 1983 
E dated March 1, 1983, on the ground that the process under-taken by it does 
not amount to manufacture. The Assistant Collector allowed the exemp-
tion but on appeal the Collector held that the respondent was liable to pay 
duty because the process undertaken by it amounted to manufacture 
inasmuch as a new commodity emerges out of the adopted process. On 
F 
further appeal there was a difference of opinion between two Members of 
the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal. Member (Tech-
nical) held that the process undertaken by the respondent was merely for 
improving the quality of purity of the chemicals and does not amount to 
manufacture; even after purification, the chemicals are known by the very 
same name and that there was no change in the che'!lical formula even 
G after purification. On the other hand Member (Judicial) took a contrary 
view and held that the process undertaken by the respondent was not a 
simple process and that the said process brings in a transformation which 
will change the name, character and use making the goods excisable. In 
view of this difference of opinion tlie matter was referred to a third 
H Member who held in favour of the respondent-manufacturer. However he 
84 
C.C.E. v. FINE CHEMICALS 
85 
did not deal with the several aspects dealt with in the opinions of the two A 
differing members. He did not also indicate whether he agreed or dis-
agreed with the findings recorded by the Member (Judicial). 
Against the decision of the Tribunal, Revenue preferred an appeal 
to this Court. 
Remitting the matter for fresh opinion of the third Member of the 
Tribunal, this Court 
HELD: 1. The definition of the expression 'manufacture' under 
Section 2(1) of the Act is not confined to the natural meaning of the 
expression 'manufacture' but is an expansive definition. Certain processes, 
which may not have otherwise amounted to manufacture, are also brought 
within the purview of and placed within the ambit of the said definition by 
the Parliament. Not only processes which are incidental and ancillary to 
B 
c 
the completion of manufactured product but also those processes as are 
specified in relation to any goods in the section or chapter notes of the D 
schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 are also brought within the 
ambit of the definition. Though the principles enunciated are clear, it is 
. their application that present difficulties and it does not help to draw "any 
sharp or intrinsic distinction between. 'processing' and 'manufac:ture', 
"which would only result in an oversimplification of both and tends to blur E 
their interdependence in cases such as the present one". It would also be 
not right to try to restrict the sweep of the definition with reference to 
Entry 84 List I of the seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Since the 
constitutionality of the said definition has been repeatedly upheld with 
reference to both Entries 84 and 97 of List I, the definition must be 
understood in terms it is couched. It should also be remembered that the F 
question whether a particnlar process does or does not amount to 
'manufacture' as defined under section 2(1) is always a question offact to 
be determined in the facts of a given case. One of the main tests evolved 
is whether on acconnt of the processes employed or applied by the assessee, 
the commodity so obtained is no longer regarded as the original com- G 
modity but is, instead, recognised a a distinct and new article that bas 
emerged as a result of the processes. [93-F to H, 94-A to Cf 
Union of India v.

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.