CHIRONJILAL SHARMA HUF versus UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
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A B [2013] 12 S.C.R. 666 CHIRONJILAL SHARMA HUF v. UNION OF !NOIA AND ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 10601 of 2013) NOVEMBER 26, 2013 [R.M. LODHA, MADAN B. LOKUR AND KURIAN JOSEPH, JJ.] Income Tax Act, 1961 - s.1328(4)(b) - Payment of C interest on delayed assessment- Search conducted in house of appellant - Cash amount of Rs. 2,35,0001- recovered - Order passed u/s.132(5) on 31.5.1990 - Assessing Officer (A.O.) calculated tax liability and cash seized in search from appellant's house appropriated - Order of A. 0. set-aside by D Tribunal - Revenue accepted the order of Tribunal - Appellant got refund of Rs.2,35,0001- alongwith interest from 4.3.1994 (date of last of the regular assessments by A.O.) until the date of refund - Claim of appellant-assessee for interest u/s.1328(4)(b) for the period from expiry of period of E six months from the date of order under s. 132(5) to the date of regular assessment order - Held: Order u/s. 132(5) having been passed on 31.5.1990, six months expired on 30.11.1990 and the last of the regular assessments was done on 4.3.1994, hence, appellant entitled to claim simple interest u/ F s.1328(4)(b) from 1.12.1990 to 4.3.1994 at the rate of 15% per annum. In the search conducted in the house of the appellant on 31.1.1990, a cash amount of Rs. 2,35,0001- was recovered. On 31.5.1990, an order under Section 132(5) G of the Income Tax Act, 1961 came to be passed. The Assessing Officer calculated the tax liability and the cash seized in the search from the appellant's house was appropriated. However, the order of the Assessing Officer was finally set-aside by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. H 666 CHIRONJILAL SHARMA HUF v. UNION OF INDIA 667 The revenue accepted the order of the Tribunal. A Consequently, the appellant was refunded the amount of Rs. 2,35,000/- along with interest from 4.3.1994 (date of last of the regular assessments by the Assessing Officer) until the date of refund. In the instant appeal, the appellant (assessee) claimed entitlement to interest under Section 1328(4)(b) of the Act which was holding the field at the relevant time for the period from expiry of period of six months from B the date of order under Section 132(5) to the date of C regular assessment order. The order under Section 132(5) of the Act having been passed on 31.5.1990, six months expired on 30.11.1990 and the last of the regular assessments was done on 4.3.1994, the assessee claimed interest under Section 1328(4)(b) of the Act from 1.12.1990 to 4.3.1994. D Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. A close look at the provisions of Section 1328(4)(a) and (b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 clearly E shows that where the aggregate of the amounts retained under Section 132 of the Act exceeds the amounts requited to meet the liability under Section 1328(1 )(i), the department is liable to pay simple interest at the rate of fifteen percent on expiry of six months from the date of F the order under Section 132(5) of the Act to the date of the regular assessment or re-assessment or the last of such assessments or reassessments, as the case may be. In the instant case, it is true that in the regular assessment done by the Assessing Officer, the tax liability for the relevant period was found to be higher G and, accordingly, the seized cash under Section 132 of the Act was appropriated against the assessee's tax liability but the fact of the matter is that the order of the Assessing Officer was over-turned by the Tribunal. finally, on 20.2.2004. As a matter of fact, the inte~~$t for the postΒ· H 668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R. A assessment period i.e. from 4.3.1994 until refund on the excess amount has already been paid by the department to the assessee. The department denied the payment of interest to the assessee under Section 132B(4)(b) on the ground that the refund of excess amount is governed by B Section 240 of the Act and Section 132B(4)(b) of the Act has no application. But, Section 132B(4)(b) deals with pre- assessment period and there is no conflict between this provision and Section 240 or for that matter 244(A). The former deals with pre-assessment period in the matters C of search and seizure and the later deals with post assessment period as per the order in appeal. The view of the department is not right on the plain reading of Section 132B(4)(b) of the Act. The appellant is entitled to the simple interest at
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