CHIRANJILAL SRILAL GOENKA (DEAD) BY LRS. versus JASJIT SINGH AND ORS.

Citation: [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R. 313 · Decided: 01-12-2000 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M. JAGANNADHA RAO · Disposal: Set Aside
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Judgment (excerpt)

CHlRANJILAL SRILAL GOENKA (DEAD) BY LRS. 
v. 
JASJIT SINGH AND ORS. 
DECEMBER l, 2000 
[M. JAGANNADHA RAO AND M.B. SHAH, JJ.] 
Hindu Law: 
A 
B 
Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956- Sedions 12 and 13 ·-
Right of disposal of property by the adoptive father by will-'Agreement to C 
the contrary '-Meaning of -Letter written by father of the adopted child to 
the adoptive father- Letter making adoptive son sole inheritor of property. 
Adoptive father and mother given absolute right during their lifetime- Held, 
it is not an agreement to the contrary. 
Registration Act, 1908-Section 17 Compulsory registration - D 
Adoption of child-Agreement restraining the adoptive father from disposing 
of the property by will-Held, agreement is compulsorily registrable. 
The appellant had filed a Writ Petition challenging the order of the 
Gold Control Administrator confiscating gold under the Gold Control Orders. 
The writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed. The appellant preferred E 
an appeal before this court. 
During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant died. His daughter and 
his adopted son both claimed to be legal heirs of the deceased appellant. The 
daughter claimed on the basis of a will executed by the appellant in her 
favour, whereas the adopted son claimed that he was adopted pursuant to a F 
letter dated 26.1.1961 written by his father to the appellant. The said letter 
dated 26.1.1991 mentioned that the adopted son will inherit all the moveable 
and immovable property of the appellant. The letter further mentioned that 
during their lifetime, the appellant and his wife would have absolute right 
to the property of the appellant. The letter was not signed by the appellant. 
This Court, by consent of parties, appointed an arbitrator to settle the 
dispute as to who would be the legal heirs to the estate of the appellant. The 
arbitrator made an award on I 6.6.2000 holding that the will in favour of the 
daughter was inoperative and that the adopted son was the sole heir of the 
estate of the appellant as his adopted son. 
313 
G 
H 
314 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 120001 Sl!Pl'. 5 S.CR. 
A 
The son filed an application before this Court to make the award of the 
arbitrator rule of the Court and pass a decree in terms of the award. The 
daughter challenged the award by filing her objections under Sections 30 
and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The objections raised by the daughter 
were:-
B 
(i) 
that the letter dated 26.1.1961 cannot be considered to be an 
agreement between the appellant and the father of the adopted 
son as there is nothing to show that the offer made by the father 
of the adopted son was accepted by the appellant. 
(ii) that the letter dated 26. 1.1961 does not restrict disposal of 
C 
property by transfer or by will; and 
D 
(iii) that if the letter is construed as limiting the right of the 
appellant to bequeath the property by will, it would require 
registration and as it was not registered, it was not admissible 
in evidence. 
Holding the award of the arbitrator to be inoperative and setting it 
aside, the court. 
HELD: I.I. It cannot be said that by the letter dated 26.1.1961, there 
is any agreement limiting the rights of the appellant to dispose of his property 
E by executing a will. [323-CI 
1.2. Presuming that the letter dated 26.1.1961 was written by the father 
of the adopted child to the appellant at the time of giving the adopted son in 
adoption, there can be no doubt that it does not reflect any agreement between 
the parties. At the most it was only a unilateral offer giving child in adoption 
F on certain expectations. The letter appears to be signed by number of persons 
and if really the appellant had accepted it, then he would have placed his 
signatures on the said letter. There is nothing on record that he accepted 
the same as it was. (321-E, FJ 
1.3. The letter dated 26. I.1961 clearly mentions that during the lifetime 
G of the appellant and his wife, they were the absolute owners of their properties. 
There is nothing to indicate in the said letter that it was a covenant or a 
contract restricting the powers of the appellant or his wife to dispose of the 
property either by transfer or by Will. Nowhere it is stated that during his 
lifetime, the appellant will not be entitled to dispose of his property either 
by transfer or by Will. Hence, there is no positive or negative agreement 
H limiting the rights of the appellant to dispose of the property by exec
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