CHINNATHAYI ALIAS VEERALAKSHMI versus KULASEKARA PANDIYA NAICKER AND ANOTHER

Citation: [1952] 1 S.C.R. 241 · Decided: 14-12-1951 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

I 
• 
S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
CHINNATHAYI alias VEERALAKSHMI 
ti. 
KULASEKARA PANDIYA NAICKER 
AND ANOTHER 
(and connected appeals) 
[SAIYID FAzL Au, MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN and 
CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.] 
241 
lmpartible 
estate-Succession-Extinction of branch-Disputes 
11S to succession-Compromise-Construction 
of deed-Disruption 
of family-Renunciation of right to succession by junior membePs of 
other branches-Sufficiency of evidence-Right to effect partitiQ1l-
Eff ect of general words of release. 
· 
To establish that an impartible estate has ceased to be JOint 
family property for purposes of succession it is necessary to prove 
an intention, express or implied, on the part of the junior 
members of the family to give up their chance of succeeding to 
the estate. In each case it is incumbent on the plaintiff to adduce 
satisfactory grounds for holding that the joint ownership of the 
defendant's branch in the estate was determined so that it became 
the separate property of the last holder's branch. 
The test 
to 
be applied is whether the facts show a clear intention to renounce 
or surrender any interest in the impartible estate or a relin-
quishment of the right of successsion and an intention to impress 
upon the zamindari the character of separate property. 
The right to bring about a partition of an impartible 
estate 
cannot be inferred from the power of alienation that the holder 
thereof may possess. 
In the case of an impartible estate the 
power to divide it amongst the members does not exist, 
though 
the power in the holder to alienate it is there, and from the 
existence of the one power the other cannot be deduced, as it is 
,... 
destructive of the very nature and character of the estate and 
makes it partible property. 
A member of a joint family owning an impartible estate can 
on behalf of himself and his heirs renounce his right of succession 
but any such relinquishment must operate for the benefit of all 
the members and the surrender must be. in, favour of all the 
branches of the family as representing all its members. 
General words of release in a release deed do not mean release 
of rights other than those then put up, and have to be limited to 
the circumstances which were in the contemplatiqn of the 
parties 
when it was executed. 
1951 
Dec. U. 
1951 
Chinnathayi 
alias 
Veeralak.shmi 
v. 
Kulasek.ara 
Pandiya Naick.er 
and Another. 
242 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1952] 
On the death of the holder of an impartible estate who repre-
sented the first branch his widow K got into possession claiming 
that the estate was the separate property of her hu.sband and 
also under a will. Disputes arose between her and the members 
of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th branches of the family and these were 
settled amicably. S who 
\Vas the senior member of the 3rd 
branch obtained village D and one-fourth of certain pannai lands 
as absolute owner and executed a release deed on 6th May, 1890, 
in these terms : "Whatever rights over the said zamin proper-
ties and in all other abovementioned properties S might possess 
he gives up such rights absolutely in favour of the said K and 
her heirs enabling them to enjoy them with the power of aliena-
have no claim at all to the properties shown as belonging to K." 
KS Who represented the 2nd branch and had instituted a suit 
ti on thereof by gift, sale etc.. . . . . . . . The said S and his heirs shall 
against- K compromised the suit on the 10th May, 1890, 
under a 
deed which provided inter alia: (i) that the zamindari shall be 
enjoyed by K till her lifetime and that KS and his heirs shall after 
the lifetime of K enjoy the zamindari except village D 'vhich was 
given to S; (ii) village B and one-fourth of certain pannai lands 
shall be given to KS absolutely ; (iii) all other pannai lands, build-
ings and movables which belonged to K's husband shall be enjoyed 
by K and her heirs absolutely." 
On the death of K the 
estate 
became vested in Z, the son of KS. The death of Z without 
_issue the second branch became extinct and disputes arose 
with 
regard to the ownership of the pannai lands and buildings, 
village B, and the zamindari between the widow of Z (who was 
the grand-daughter of K) and the senior members of the 3rd and 
.4th branches : 
Held (i) that as KS was competent to alienate the pannai lands 
and buildings in favour of K and vest her with absolute 
title, 
and S had also agreed to give them to her absolutely, K became 
the absolute owner of t

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