CHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY versus SUPERINTENDENT OF STAMPS AND MAHARASHTRA SUGAR MILLS LTD.
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1950 Dr.N.B. Khare v. The Stale of Delhi Mukhnjea]. 1950 536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19501 force, and consequently the order made by the District Magistrate in the present case cannot stand. I would, therefore, allow the application and quash the externment order that has been passed against the petitioner. Petition dismissed. Agent for the petitioner: Gan pat Rai. Agent for the opposite party: P. A. Mehta. CHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY AND SUPERINTENDENT OF STAMPS ti. MAHARASHTRA SUGAR MILLS LTD. [SHR1 HARILAL KANg C. J., SAIYID FAzL Au, PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and MUKHERJEA J J.) Indian Stamp Act (II of 1899), ss. 57, 59 (2)-Reference lo High Court-Nature of power .to refer-Duty to refer on reque.11 of party affected-Order directing Chief Controlling Authority to refer-Whether "matter concerning revenues"-furisdiction of Original Side of High Court-Government of India Act, 1935, s. 266(1). The power conferred on the Chief Revenue Authority by Sec. 57 of the Indian Stamp Act, to make a reference to the High Court is not intended for the benefit of the Revenue Authority alone, but ensures, also for the benefit of the party affected by the assessment. It is th~reforc coupled with a duty to make a reference when he is called upon to do so by the party affected, and if he declines to do so, it is within the power of the Court to direct him to discharge that ducy and make a reference to the Court. Alcock Ashdown & Co., Ltd. v. Chief Revenue Authority (SO I.A. 227) and /ulius v. Bishop of Orford (5 A.C. 214) applied. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 537 The order of a High Court to a revenue officer to do his duty would not be the exercise of original jurisdiction in a matter concerning the revenue within the meaning of Sec. 226 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the jurisdiction of the High Court to direct the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority to make a reference under Sec. 57 of the Stamp Act was not barred by Sec. 226 of the Government of India Act. The fact that the proceedings had passed beyond the stage -:if enforcing payment does not preyent the High Court from directing the Revenue Authority to make a reference, for, if the opinion of the Court on the reference is against the Revenue Autho- . rity he will have to refund whatever has been recovered in excess, under Sec. 59 (2) of the Act. APPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at Bombay : Civil Appeal No. XII of 1950. This was an appeal from a judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay (Chagla, Acting C. J. and Bhagwati J.) dated 2nd September, 1947, in Appeal No. 60 of 1946. The facts are fully set out in the judgment. C. K. Daphtary, Advocate-General of Bombay (M. M. Desai, with him) for the appellant. M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (S.S. Ragnekar, with him) for the respondent. 1950. May 27. The judgment of the Court was delivered by . · KANIA C. J.-This is an appe-al from a judgment of the High Court at Bombay and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to direct · the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and the Superintendent of Stamps at Bombay to state a case for the opinion of the Court under section 57 of the Stamp Act. The respondent company, for its business, borrowed money from the Central Bank of India Ltd. at Bombay. In order to secure the loan a document was executed on the 22nd of March, 1945, with a stamp of Rs. 16-8-0, on the footing that it was a deed of· hypothecation without possession of the goods. When the deed was sent to the Sub-Registrar for registration he impounded the same and sent it to the Stamp Office. The Assistant Superintendent of Stamps 1950 Chief Conli'ollina Rev. Authority v. MaharashlTa Sugar Mills Ltd. Kania C.J. 1950 CliiAJ ConJrol/ing Rev. Aflthori!J Vo Maharashlr• Gug«r Mills-W. Eam•C.J. 538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950] wrote to the respondent that the document was a mortgage with possession, chargeable with duty under article 40 (a) of the Schedule and inquired why it was not duly stamped before execution. The respond- ent's solicitors in their reply contended that the document was not, and was never intended by the parties to be, a mortgage with possession. They pointed out that no possession of the property had been given or was intended to 'be given, except in certain contingencies and therefore the document was p
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