CHET RAM VASHIST versus MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI & ANR.
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
).- .• CHET RAM VASHIST v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI & ANR. November 5, 1980 [R.S. PATHAK AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J Delhi Municipal Corporation Act !957 S. 313(1) (3) and (Si-Sancrion to a lay-o«t plan-application for-Failure of Standing Committee to accord sanction within period specified in S. 313(3}-app/fcant whether can regard lay-out plan as sanctioned. The Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 by sub-section (1) of section 313 obliges the owner of the land. before utilising, selling or otherwise deal· ing with the land under section 312 to apply to the Commissioner with a lay- out plan of the land for sanction to the lay-out plan. Sub-section (3) of the said section requires the Standing Commitee, within sixty days after receipt of the application, either to accord sanction to the lay-out plan or to disallow it or ask for further information in respect of it. If further information is asked for, the ban on the owner utilising, selling or otherwise de~Iing with the land continues to operate until orders have been passed by the, Standing Committee on receipt of the information. The appellant's father who owned a large parcel of land situated within the Municipal limits, decided on developing the land as a residential colony and submitted a lay-out plan for sanction under section 313, which was sanc· tioned by the Standing Committee on 10th December, 1958. After the death of the appellant's father, the appellant thought it desirable that the lay-out plan should include provision for the construction of a cinema and he submitted an application dated 20th April, 1967 accompanied by a copy of the sanction- ed lay-out plan indicating the proposed changes, and prayed for an early sanction in terms of the provisions of section 313. The Town Planner of the Corporation informed by letter, dated 14th June, 1967 that as the application did not fal! within the purview of section 313, and that as the Master Plan did not envisage a cinema within a residential area, the request could not be considered. Some correspondence followed and ultimately by letter, dated 29th September, 1969 the appellant was informed that his proposal could not be accepted. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed a Writ Petition in the High Court alleging that the application had not been considered by the Standing Commit· tee and as the period prescribed by the statute for doing so had expired th11 revised lay-out plan must be treated as having been sanctioned. The Singh> Judge of the High Court allowed the Writ Petition and directed the Corpora- tion to treat the revised lay-out plan as having been approved but observed that it was open to the Standing Committee under sub-section (5) of section 313 to prohibit the construction of the cinema. The respondent-Corporation preferred a Letters Patent Appeal and the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant was not entitled to invoke sub-section (3) of section 313. In the appeal to this Court, on the question, whether the failure ·of the Standing Committee of the Municipal Corporation to consider under mb·lieCtion A B c D p G '1:074 SUPREME.COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R. A (3) of section 313 of the. Act, an application for sanclion to a lay-out plan within the period specified in the sub-section can result in a deemed grant of the sanction : HELD: I. Merely because the Standing Committee does not consider the grant of sanction on the application made under sub-section (]) of section 313 within the specified period, does not entitle the applicant to regard the Jay-out plan B; as having been sanctioned. [1080F] c D E F G H 2. The Municipal Corporation is obliged to refer the application dated 20th April, 1967 alongwith the lay-out plan accompanying it, to its Standing Committee !Ci dispos0e of the application expeditiously in accordance with law. [1082B] 3. Sub-sections (3) and (5) of section 313 prescribe a period within which the Standing Committee is expected to deal with the application made under sub-section (1). But neither sub-section declares that if the Standing Committee does not deal with the application within the prescribed period of sixty days it will be deemed that sanction has been accorded. The statute merely requires the Standing Committee to consider the application within sixty days. It stops short of indicating what will be the result if the Standing C
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
Lex