CHANDRA PRAKASH AGARWAL versus CHATURBHUJ DAS PARIKH & ORS.

Citation: [1970] 3 S.C.R. 354 · Decided: 18-12-1969 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.M. SIKRI · Disposal: Dismissed
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Judgment (excerpt)

354 
CHANDRA PRAKASH AGARWAL 
v. 
CIDrrURBHUJ DAS PARIKH & ORS, 
December 18, 1969 
(S. K. SIKRI, J. M. SHELAT, V. 'BHARGAVA, G. K. MITTER 
AND 
B 
C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.J 
Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 2l7(2)(b)-"Atlvoccte of a High 
Court", meaning of Art. 124(3) and 233(2)-Legal Practitioners Act, 
1891-Bar Councils Act, 1926. 
The appointment of the respondent as a Judge of the High Court was 
C 
challenged on the ground that though he was enroUed as an advocate 
n1ore than twenty years ago he could not claim to be one who "has for 
at least ten years been an advocate of a High Court" as he was all alo11g 
practicing in the Muflasi/ and not in the High Court. 
HELD : The expression "an Advocate of a High Court" in 
Art. 
217(2)(b) mean an advocate on the roll of a High Court and entitled 
as of right by that reason to practice in the High Court. There is nothing 
D 
in the Article to indicate that an Advocate Of a High Court can only be 
that· advocate who has been prac:ising in the High Court. [358 HJ 
Senga/ani Gramani v. Subayya Nadar, 
A.LR. 1967 Mad. 344 
aod 
V. G. Row v. Alogiriswamy, A.LR. 1967 Mad. 347, referred to. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 
2331 
of 1968. 
E 
Appeal from the judgment and order dated July 24, 1968 of 
the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 
14433 of 
1968. 
M. P. Baipai, S. M. 
Jain 
and G. 
M. 
Wantoo, for the. F 
appellant. 
0. P. Rana, for respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 5. 
I. N. Shroff, for respondent No. 3. 
L. M. Singhvi and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 4. 
The Judgment of the Couri was delivered by 
Shelat, J. 1 he appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court 
at A11:thabad for a quo warranto against respondent 1, challenging 
therein his appointment as a Judge of that High Court. 
The 
ground on which he challenged the appointment was that though 
respondent 1 was enrolled as an advocate more than 20 years ago 
he could not still claim to be one who "has for at least ten. year~ 
been an advocate of a High Court" within the meaning of Art. 
G 
H 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
c. P. AGARWAL v. c. D. PARIKH (She/at,/.) 
355 
217(2)(b) of the Constitution, as admittedly respondent 1 was all 
along practising at Benaras and not in ihe High Court. 
The writ.petition came up for a preliminary hearing before W. 
Broome and G. Kumar, JJ., when it was urged that the expres-
sion "an advocate of a High Court" in Art. 217(2)(b) meant an 
advocate practising in the High Court and not one practising in a 
court or courts subordinate to the High Court. 
In support of that 
interpretation, the language used in Art. 124(3} on the one hand 
and that in Art. 233(2) on the other was relied on to show that 
the Constitution has e!llployed different language in connection 
with different purposes thereby making a deliberate distinction bet-
ween "an advocate" and "an advocate of a High Court", the former 
meaning an advocate practising in a court or courts subordinate 
to the High Court and the latter meaning an advocate practising 
in a High Court. 
The con:ention was that while dealing with the 
qualifications for the post of a district judge Art. 233 (2) uses the 
expression "an advocate" as distinguished from the expression 
"advocate of a High Court" in Arts. 217(2)(b) and 124(3) which 
lay down the qualifications for the offices of a Judge of a High 
Court and a Judge of the Supreme Court. 
The difference in the 
language, .it was contended, indicated that whereas a person to be 
appointed a district judge need be only an advocate of the pres-
cribed standing, the one to be appointed a Judge either of a High 
Court or the Supreme Court must be an advocate who has prac-
tised for the required number of years in a High Court or two or 
more· High Courts iii succession. 
It was further contended that 
such an indic~tion is also furnished by the language of Art. 124(3) 
(a) and (b), in the sense that just as the expression "a judge of a 
High Court" in sub-cl. (a) must mean a Judge who has worked as 
a Judge in the High Court, the expression "an advocate of a High 
Court" must similarly mean an advocate who has practised in a 
High Court. 
Tl!ere was a difference of opinion between the two learned 
Judges, Broome, J. held that "on a plain reading of the relevant 
clauses" the correct interpretation of the expression "an advocate 
of a High Court" meant an advocate enrolled as an advocate of a 
High Court, irrespective of whether on such enrolment he prac-
tised in
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