CHANDMAL versus FIRM RAM CHANDRA AND VISHWANATH

Citation: [1991] 2 S.C.R. 732 · Decided: 07-05-1991 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: B.C. RAY · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

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CHAND MAL 
v. 
FIRM RAM CHANDRA AND VISHWANA1H 
MAY 7, 1991 
[B.C. RAY AND J.S. VERMA, JJ.) 
Hyderabad House (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954--
Section 26--Revisionary jurisdiction of High Court-Scope of. 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section 115-Revision-Scope 
of. 
The appellant-landlord filed a suit for eviction of the respondent 
firm-defendant-commission agent irrm, from his shop under section 
15(3)(a)(iii) of the Hyderabad House (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control 
Act, 1954 on the ground that the appellant required the Suit si.op for his 
own personal use as he intended to start commission agency and other 
business; and that the respondent did not vacate the premise inspite of 
his two notices, terminating the tenancy. 
The respondent filed written statement before the Additional Rent 
Controller accepting the ownership of the appellant and tenancy of the 
respondent and denied the appellant's allegation that he required the 
premises for his personal use, as the appellant was a member of Hindu 
Joint family comprising of his father, and his brothers and appellant; 
the appellant as one of the partners of registered firm runs a kirana of 
commission agency shop under the name and style of M/s Rajmal 
Sumermal Surana and the appellant owned many houses and shops and 
as such was not entitled to an order of eviction. In the additional written 
statement it was further stated that the appellant purchased the house 
from one registered partnership irrm and one of the partners of the firm 
was occupying the house as a permanent tenant since Samwat 2002. It 
was also contended that the partners of the irrm were not made parties 
to the eviction proceedings and hence the suit was not tenable. 
The Trial Court considering the evidence allowed the suit holding 
that the appellant was entitled to evict the respondent in view of the 
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provisions of Section 15(2)(vi) of the Act, though the plea of bona fide 
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requirement was negatived. 
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The tenant-respondent filed an appeal under section 25 before the 
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CHANDMAL v. FIRM 
733 
District Judge, which was dismissed though it was held that the land-
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lord failed to prove that he required the premises for personal use • 
.,. 
The tenant-respondent's revision petition under section 26 to the 
High Court, was allowed by a Single Judge. 
Allowing the landlord's appeal, this Court 
HELD: 1. The jurisdiction of the High Court in revision against 
the order passed on appeal by the District Judge is a limited one and It is 
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almost pari materia with the provisions of Section 115 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure. The High Court while exercising the revisional juris-
diction can interfere with the order passed on appeal by the appellate C 
authority only on three grounds, i.e. (i) where the original or apellate 
authority exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (ii) where 
the original or appellate authority failed to exercise a Jurtsdlctlon so 
vested, or (iii) where in following the procedure or passing the order, 
the original or appellate authority acted illegally or with material 0 
irregularity. [738C-E] 
2. The findings in any view of the matter whatsoever cannot 
be held to be either without jurisdiction nor it can amount to a failure 
to exercise jurisdiction vested with them, nor it can be held to be 
made by the original or appellate authority illegally or with material 
irregularity. [738G] 
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3. The revisional jurisdiction of tiie High Court under Section 26 
of the said Act is coniined strictly to the jurisdictional error or illegal 
exercise of jurisdiction. The ilnding .of the High Court to the effect that 
it was the duty of the Court in the interest of justice to interfere even 
with the concurrent fmding-of facts becau5e on the record, High Court F 
found that there was not a single factor to come to the conclusion 
that the claim was mala fide or was not bona fide as required by 
the statute, is entirely baseless and not in accordance with the pro-
visions of Section 26 of said Act whiclt confers revisional Jurisdiction 
on the High Court. [738H-739BJ 
4. The claim of permanent tenancy by one of the partners has 
been clearly and unequivocally made in the additional written state-
ment r.ted on behalf of the respondent. 1n such circumstances, the 
provisions of Section 15(2) (vi') of the said Act are applicable and an 
order of eviction can very well be passed on this ground alone. [739F] 
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