LexCHANDER BHAN GOSAIN versus ST ATE OF ORISSA & ORS.
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2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS to refer to the High Court the question of law raised in this appeal was alsc1 rejected by the High Court. It is, therefore, said that this appeal is concluded by the order of the High Court last mentioned. But it appears that this Court had granted leave to appeal from the High Court's order refusing to issue the writ before the appeal to the tribunal had been dismissed. The appellant could have appealed from the High Court's order refusing to direct a reference of the question but he chose to prosecute the appeal against the order in the petition for the writ which wou Id have given him the same relief. Either remedy was open to him and neither can be said in the circums- tances to be barred by the other. The appeal however fails on the merits and it is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. CHANDER BHAN GOSAIN v. ST ATE OF ORISSA & ORS. (S.K. DAS, A.K. SARKAR and M. HrnAYATULLAHJJ.) Buprtm• Court Practict-Appwl-Court Fee-One petition fika under Art. 226 to challang• many assessmtnl oraera-Appeal again1t one order of High Court-Court Jee payahlt. This appeal was against the order of the Deputy Registrar directing the present case to be registered as nine appeals and requiring the appellant to pay nine sets of court fees. The case originated out of one petition under Art. 226 of the Constition challenging the validity of various assessment orders. The High Court passed one order on the petition and one appeal was filed in this Court. C. B. Gosain •• St.if!!o/ Orissa 8rJrkt1r J, 196J A;ril 5 s.t. J. ' 1186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] voL. B•l<l that the appellant should pay only one set of court fee and other charges as in a single appeal. It could not be said that there were as many proceedings as there were asse;s- ment orders as the appellant had by a single petition challenged them all together; Lajwanli Sial's ca.!t, Petition for spf.cial leave No. 673 of 1959 and KishiKChand Ch<llaram'• case, C.A. Nos. 462 to 465 of 1960, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JumsDICTION: Civil Misc. Petition No. 1398 of 1962. Appeal against the order of the Deputy Registrar dated March 28, 1962 in Civil Appeals Nos. 41 to 49 of 1962. A. Ranganadham Chetty, B.D. Dhawan, S.K. Mehta and K.L .. Mehta, for the petitioner. C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General for India, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the re1pondents. 1963. April 5. The Order of the court was delivered by SARJURj.-This is an appeal against the order of the Deputy Registrar directmg the present case to be rc~istered as nine appeals and requiring the appellant to pay nine sets of court-fees. The Deputy Registrar had relied on two cases of this Court, namely, Laju;anti Sial's case (Petition for Special Leave No. 673of1959) and Kishinchand Chellaram's t:aBe (Civil Appeals No. 462 to 465 of 1960). We do not think that these precedents cover the present case. In Lajwanti's case there were a number of applications under s. 66 (2) of the Income-tax Act (or reference of the same question. There were in fact a number of separate references but they were .. • - 2 s.c.R.. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 887 dealt with by one judgment from which the appeal to this Court arose. That was really a case of five appeals for the common judgment must be taken to have been delivered in each of the di:!!erent reference cases. Kishinchand Ghellaram's case is also not helpful because there four applications by four different assessees had been · made for reference of three identical questions arising in each assessment case under s. 66 (1) of the Income-tax Act. Though it appears that there was one order of reference to the High Court and the High Court treated the case as a single case of reference, it could be said that there were in fact a number of references. The present case however originated out of one petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of various assessment orders. Obviously here, there was only one proceeding. It could not be said that there were as many proceedings as there were assessment orders for the petitioner had by a single petition callenged them all together. When an appeal is taken to this Court from the judgment of the High Court in such a petition, it is impossible to contend that· there are more agpeals than one. Therefore, the appellant before us is liable only to pay one set of court-fee and ot
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