CHAMPALAL versus MST. SAMARATH BAI

Citation: [1960] 2 S.C.R. 810 · Decided: 21-01-1960 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SYED JAFFER IMAM · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 3 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

810 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)] 
r96o 
the competence of the arbitrators. The High Court 
., Ai-·r 
, din appeal under the Letters Patent, did confirm the 
""/S. 
opi arsna 
d 
, 
'd 
h 
d 
b t th 
a?td sans. Ltd. or er, setting as1 e t e awar ; 
u 
ere was no 
v. 
binding decision between the parties that the claim 
The Union of Iudia described in Sch. B, that is, the claim for establish-
Shah J. 
January 2I 
ment and contingency charges, was within the 
competence of the arbitrators in reference under cl. 20. 
It may be observed that according to the High Court 
of East Punjab in the Appeal No. 31 of 1953, under 
the Letters Patent, it was not necessary to express 
any opinion whether the claim in Sch. U was within 
the competence of the arbitrators, and the claims 
described in Sch.]) does not appear to have been 
agitated in the second arbitration proceeding. 
We, accordingly, agree with the view of the High 
.Court that the Award of the arbitrators was liable to 
be set aside because of an error apparent on the face of 
the award. In this view, the appeal fails and 
i~ dismissed with costs. 
Appeal dismissed,. 
CHAMPALAL 
v. 
MST. SAMARATH BAI 
(JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR AND K. SUBBA RAO, JJ.) 
Arbitration-Award, Registration of-Power of court to extend 
time for filing-The Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940), s. 14(2)-
Jndian Ncgistration Act, (XV I of 1908), ss. 17, 49-Indian Limita-
tion Act, (J X of 1908), Art. 178-Jndian Succession Act, 1925 
(XXXIX of 1925), s. 192. 
By means of a will the respondent's husband authorised her 
to adopt the appellant, and the will was duly registered after the 
death of the testator. The relevant portion of the will ran 
thus:-
"Under this will, I am authorising the said Champalal 
Ishv,:ardas to execute the same. 
I have appointed him the 
executor of this will. 
Under the said will the said Champalal 
alone shall be the full O\vner of my entire rnovable and im-
moveable property and the executor of. the will after my 
•
-
-
-
S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
811 
death if I adopt him during my lifetime or even if my wife 
r960 
adopts him (after my death)." 
Champa/al 
The appellant applied for appointment of a curator under 
v. 
s. 192 of the Succession Act but subsequently the parties entered Mst. Samarath Bai 
into an agreement for arbitration in the matter. Three arbitra-
tors were appointed and the time for making the award was 
extended by the Court on their application. The arbitration 
agreement stated that the arbitrators had to decide what should 
be the respective rights of the parties in the estate in case the 
respondent adopted the appellant. An award was made and 
filed in Court by the arbitrators to the effect that the respondent 
should adopt the appellant according to Hindu Law within four 
months failing which the appellant would be heir and executor 
of the entire property of the deceased and the respondent would 
be entitled to a maintenance of Rs. zoo per mensem. 
But if in 
spite of the respondent's readiness to adopt, the appellant refused 
to be adopted within four months, he would not have any right 
in the property nor would he be the executor. 
The award was 
at first unregistered and on being returned it was subsequently 
registered and refiled in Court. The attorney of two of the 
arbitrators furnished to the Sub-Registrar a list of the property 
covered by the award. The proceedings under the Succession Act 
and the Arbitration Act were then separated. The respondent 
made an application under s. 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, and the 
appellant applied for setting aside the award. The Court passed 
a decree in terms of the award. The High Court on appeal by 
the appellant .upheld the award. 
On appeal by a certificate of the High Court the appellant 
contended that being an executor he could not refer the matter 
to arbitration,· that the award was not filed within the time 
prescribed by the Limitation Act, that it was not registered 
according to law, that the First Additional Judge had no jurisdic-
tion to extend time for making the award, that the arbitrators 
were guilty of misconduct and the award was in excess of the 
power given to them and that even if the awarci"was proper and 
legal the respond'"nt having refused to adopt the appellant the 
decree should have been as provided by the award on the 
happening of tlile contingency and the Court passing the decree 
had no jurisdiction to take subsequent events into consideration. 
Held, 

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.