LexCHAMELI SINGH versus THE STATE OF U.P.
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CHAMELI SINGH A v. THE STATE OF U.P. DECEMBER 15, 1995 B [K. RAMASWAMY, FAIZAN UDDIN AND B.N. KIRPAL, JJ.] Land Acquisition Act 1894, Ss. 4, 5-A and 17(1) r/w 17 (4)-Acquisition of land for consfJUcting houses for dalits-Jnvocation of urgency clause and dispensing with enquiry under s.5-A-Pre and post-notification delay of three C year~Whether S.4 notification invalid-Held, government'.< opinion on ur- gency subjective; court will not inteifere unless opinion malafide-Held further, till problem of providing houses to dalits remains unsolved, urgency subsists. Constitution of India, Article 21-Land Acquisition Act 1894, S.4-W/1ether acquisition of lands for constrncting houses for dalits deprives D right to livelihood of land owners-Held, no; individual's right must yield to large public purpose. Land Acquisition Act 1894, Ss.4 r/w S. 17(1), 17(1A) (U.P. Amend- ment) and 17 ( 4 }-Wliether lands that are neither waste nor arable can be acquired under S.17( 4 )-Held, yes; under UP. amendment to S.17( 1A) power E under S.17(4) can be invoked in case of lands other than waste or arable land. Simultaneous with the notification under S.4(1) of the Land Acquisi- tion Act, 1894, acquiring the appellants' lands for the purpose of construct- F ing houses for dalits, the declaration under S.6 was published dispensing with the enquiry under S.5-A. The appellants challenged the notification before the High Court on the ground that the lancis not being arable or waste lands and there being no urgency the State Government was not justified in resorting to its powers under S.17(1) read with S.17(4) of the Act. They further contended that the acquisition took away their only G source of livelihood and was violative of their fundamental rights under Article 21. The High Court negatived these contentions and dismissed the writ petitions. Hence these appeals. Dismissing the appeals, this Court 827 H 828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. A HELD : 1.1. So long as the nnhygienic conditions and deplorable housing needs of dalits, tribes and the poor are not solved or fulfilled, the urgency continues to subsist. When the Government on the basis of the material, constitutional and international obligation, formed its opinion of urgency, the Court, not being an appellate fornm, would not disturb the B finding unless the court conclusively finds the exercise of the power ma/a fide. [841-D] 1.2. The lethargy on the part of the officers for pre and post-notifica- tion delay would not render the exercise of the power to invoke urgency clause invalid on that account. Larger the delay, greater would be the c; urgency. [842-A] Kasiredi Papai ah v. Govemment of A.P., AIR (1975) AP 269, State of U.P. v. Pista Devi & Ors., [1986] 4 SCC 251; Deepak Pahwa v. Lt. governor of Delhi, [1985] 1 SCR 588; Af/atoon & Ors. Etc. v. Lt. Governor, Delhi & Ors., [1975] 4 SCC 285; Jage Ram & Ors. v. State of Ha1yana & Ors., [1971] D 1 SCC 671; Rajasthan Housing Board & Ors. v. Shri Kishan & Ors., [1993] 2 SCC 84 and State of U.P. & Ors. v. Keshav Prasad Singh, [1995] S SCC 587, relied on. Narayan Govind Gavate Etc. v. State of Maharashtra, [1977] 1 SCR E 763, explained and distingnished. 1.3. To bring the dalits and tribes into tho mainstream of national life providing these facilities and opportunities to them is the dnty of the state as fundamental to their basic human and constitutional rights. [834-F] F 2.1. The Plea of deprivatiou of the right to livelihood under Article 21 is unsustainable. So long as the exercise of the power is for public purpose, the individual's right of an owner must yield place to the larger public purpose. For compulsory nature of acquisition, sub-section (2) of Section 23 provides payment of solatium to the owner who declines to G voluntarily part with the possession of land. Acquisition in accordance with the procedure is a valid exercise of the power. It would not, therefore, amount to deprivation of right to livelihood. [842-C, E] 2.2. The right to shelter, does not mean a mere right to a roof over one's head but right to all the infrastructure necessary to enable them to H live and develop as a human being. Right to shelter when used as an • CHAMELISINGHv. STATE[K RAMASWAMY,J.] 829 essential requisite to the right Ip live, should be deemed to have been A guaranteed as a fundamental right. [834-C-D] Sli P.G. Gupta v. State of Gujarat & Ors., JT (1995) 2
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