CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA versus C. BERNARD

Citation: [1990] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 196 · Decided: 09-10-1990 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.M. AHMADI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 
v. 
C. BERNARD 
'. 
OCTOBER 9, 1990 
B 
[S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN, A.M. AHMADI AND 
K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, JJ.] 
Labour Law-Bank Employee-Chargesheet-Departmental 
Enquiry-Bank Official appointed as Enquiry Officer and Disciplinary 
A uthority--'-Superannuation of Enquiry Officer-Continuance and con-
e clusion of Enquiry after superannuation and imposition of punish-
ment-Held Enquiry Officer's order is incompetent and without juris-
diction-Absence of bias prejudice or ma/a [ides of the Enquiry Officer 
cannot cure the defect as to his competence~--De facto doctrine held 
inapplicable. 
D 
The respondent, a bank employee, was chargesheeted for claim-
ing L-F-C on the basis of fake travel receipts. The Bank appointed one 
of its officers as Enquiry Officer as well as Disciplinary Authority who 
conducted the departmental enquiry against the respondent. However, 
during the pendency of the enqtniry the Enquiry Officer retired from 
service. Notwithstanding his retirement from service he proceeded with 
E 
the enquiry and concluded the same against the respondent. The 
respondent participa!ed in the enquiry without raising any objection 
against the continuance of the said Enquiry by the said Enquiry Officer. 
After giving an opportunity to the respondent to be heard on the question 
of punishment the Enquiry Officer {Disciplinary Authority imposed the 
punishment of discharge. The respondent r.Jed a departmental appeal 
F 
which was dismissed. Thereafter, the respondent f'ded a writ petition in 
the High Court challenging the .order of discharge on the ground that 
the order passed by the Enquiry Officer was without jurisdiction. 
A single judge of the High Court allowed the Writ Petition, 
quashed the order of punishment with all consequential benefits to the 
G 
respondent on the ground that after retirement the Enquiry Officer was 
nobody in the hierarchy of authorities to impose punishment on the 
delinquent-employee and hence his order imposing punishment was 
incompetent and without jurisdiction. 
Against the order of the single judge the Bank preferred a Letter 
H Patent Appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court which was 
dismissed. 
196 
C.B.J. v. C. BERNARD 
197 
In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant 
Bank; (i) that the decision of the Enquiry Officer could be saved on the 
basis of de facto doctrine because (a) his initial appointment being valid 
his actions and decisions could not be invalidated by his subsequent 
retirement since he continued to function as a de facto Enquiry Officer; 
(b) even otherwise the Bank could have appointed a non-official as 
Enquiry Officer; (ii) that since the High Court quashed the punishment 
not on merits but on a mere technicality, it erred in directing payment 
of all consequential benefits to the respondent; and (iii) since the 
respondent submitted· to the jurisdiction of the Enqujry Officer and 
there was no prejudice caused to him be was estopped from raising the 
contention as to the competence or jurisdiction of the Enquiry Officer 
for the first time in the Writ Petition. 
Allowing the appeal in part, IBis .Court, 
A 
B 
c 
HELD: 1. The de facto doctrine has to requisit~s, namely, (i) the 
possession of the office and the performance of the duties attached 
thereto, and (ii) colour of title, that is, apparent right to the office and 
D 
acquiescence in the possession thereof by the public. According to this 
doctrine the acts of officers de facto performed within the sphere of 
their assumed official authority, in the interest of the public or third 
parties and not for their own interest, are generally held valid and 
binding as if they were performed by de jure officers. This doctrine can 
be invoked in cases where __ there is an appointment to office which is 
E 
defective; but notwithstanding the defect to the title of the office, the 
decisions made by such a de facto officer clothed with the powers and 
functions of the office would be as efficacious as those made by a de jure 
officer. The same would, however, not be true of a total intruder or 
usurper of office. The doctrine envisages that acts performed de facto 
by officers within the scope of their assumed official authority are to be 
F 
regarded as binding as if they were performed by officers de ju re. While 
the de facto doctrine saves official acts done by an officer whose 
appointment is found to be defective the private parties to a litiga

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