C.W.S. (INDIA) LIMITED versus THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
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C.W.S. (INDIA) LIMITED
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v.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
MARCH 1,1994
(B.P. JEEVAA REDDY AND B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.)
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Income tax Act, 1961: Sections 40{c)(iii), 40(a)(v) & 40A(5)-Section
40( a)(v) in force upto 31-3-1972:-Section 40A(5) substituted with effect from
1.4.1972-lnterpretation of the provisiort-Amenities or perquisites to
employees beyond a particular limit-Disallowance of-Whether valid.
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Intepretation of Statutes: Objects of all the rules of interpretation is to
give effect to the object of the enactment having regard to the language
useiJ-lntepretation not a mechanical exercise.
Section 40(a)(v) of the Income tax Act, 1961 was in force till D
31.3.1972. It was substituted by Section 40A(S) with effect from 1.4.1972.
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Both provisions were substantially similar. The two provisions were In
force successively form April 1,1963 to March 31,1989. These provisions
were enacted with a view to discourage the assessees from Incurring
expenditure which resulted directly or lmdirectly In the provision of any
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benefit, amenity or perquisite to their employees beyond a particular llmlL
Any expenditure beyond the prescribed llmite was disallowed.
In the present appeals, such disallow were challenged, raising ques·
tions relatlug to the interpretation of Section 40(11)(v)
Dismissing the appeals, this Court
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HELD: 1.1. While literary construction may be the general rule in
construing taxing enactments, it d0t:• not mean that It should be adopted
even if it leads to a discriminatory or incongrous result. Interpretation of
statutes cannot be a mechanical exercise. Object of all the rules of inter· G
pretatlon is tb give effect to the object of the enactment having regard to
the language used. (254-E)
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1.2. Section 40(a){v) of the Income tax Act, 1961 is only and expanded
version of Section 40(c)(iii). The idea was to bring the allowances in
respect of the assets owned by the assessee, which assets are used by its H
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SUPREME COlJRT Rl'POHIS
(1994)2 S.C.R.
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employee for his own purposes or benefit, within the net or ceiling. Section
40(c)(iii) did not cover such allowances and this was sought to be
remedied. The idea was certainly not to bring about a different treatment
of two situations In Section 40(a)(v). The consequence of accepting the
assessee's interpretation would be that while tile ceiling un expenditure
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would apply to a certain case, no such ceiling would apply to certain other
cases. The consequence would not only be discriminatory but also very
incongruous, almost absurd. In principle, there is no distinction between
the two cases or the two situations, as they may be called. Mere use of the
word 'such" should not have the effect of driving the court to place an
interpretation upon the said clause which is not only discriminatory but
is highly incongrous. [254-A-D]
Commissioner of Income-tux, Kera/a-I v. Travancore Tea Estates Co.
Ltd., 122 I.T.R. 557, approved.
Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Forbes, Ewart and Figgies( P) Ltd., 138
D I.T.R.1, disapproved.
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Maxwell's 'Interpretation of Statutes' (12th Edn.), referred to.
2. So far as Section 40A(5) is concerned, controversy does not and
cannot arise for the reason that the second part of clause (ii) in sub-section
(5) does not use the words "such employee" but uses the words "an
employee". It is not without signigificance that while substantially repeating.
the provision in Section 40(a)(v) in Section 40A(5)(a)(ii), the Parliament
bas taken care to substitute the word "such' with the word "an". [255-F]
3. Both Sections 40(a) (v) and 40(5) (a) (ii) speak of "any allowance in ,
respect of any assets of the assessee used by an employee". The asset may
be a building, a car, a refrigerator or an air-conditioner or any other asset.
The allowance in respect of such assets certainly means and includes
depreciation allowance on such assets. [255-H; 256-A]
4. In respect of the other question urged viz. that amount expended
on repairs is not includible in the expenditure referred to in Sections
4ll(a)(v) and 40A(5)(a)(ii), it does not appear from the order of the High
Court that the said question was either referred to it or was answered by '
it. Therefore, this Court declines to go into the said question. However, in
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respe<'l of this question the relevant appeals shall subsist and shall be
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C.W.S. LTD. v. C.1.T. (JEEVAN REDDY,J.]
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