C. SAMPATH KUMAR versus THE ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE, MADRAS

Citation: [1997] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 142 · Decided: 16-09-1997 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.S. ANAND, K. VENKATASWAMI · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
C. SAMPATH KUMAR 
v. 
THE ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, ENFORCEMENT 
DI RECTO RA TE, MADRAS 
SEPTEMBER 16, 1997 
[DR. A.S. ANAND AND K. VENKATASWAMI, JJ.] 
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 : 
S.40-Summons issued under the section-Statement of the person to 
whom summons issued recorded-Writ petition filed by him challenging the 
issuance of summons and contending that he could not be compelled to give 
his Statement in writing-Writ petition dismissed by High Court-Held, a 
person to whom summons are issued under S.40 may be called upon to give 
D his statement in writing and sign it and such a course is not prohibited either 
by the statute or the Constitution-Administration of caution to such a 
person that not making a truthfal statement would be an offence cannot be 
construed as use of "pressure" to "extract" the statement-Such a caution 
has statutory backing of S. 40(3) itself and is in effect in the interest of the 
person who is making the statement in view of the provisions of S. 40 (4). 
E 
Amba Lal v. Union of India & Ors., AIR (1961) SC 264, followed. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6446of1997. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.3.96 of the Madras High Court 
F in W.A. No. 329of1996. 
S.S. Ray, T.S. Arunachalam, K.T.S. Tulsi, S.B. Wad, Jinasenan, N. Jothi, 
K.K. Mani, K.V. Vishwanathan, Vikas Pahwa, K.V. Vijayakumar, S.N. Bhat, 
Manoj Wad and V.K. Verma for the appearing parties. 
G 
The following Order of the Court was delivered : 
Leave granted. 
This appeal is directed against the judgement and order of the High 
H Court dated 28th March, 1996 in Writ Appeal No. 329 of 1996. 
I42 
C.S. KUMAR v. ENFORCEMENT OFFIC~R. ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE 143 
Summons were issued by the respondent to appellant under Section 40 A 
of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (hereinafter called as FERA) to 
appear before him on the fixed date. After putting in certain conditions for 
his appearance, the appellant appeared before the respondent on 15th May, 
1996 when his statement was recorded. His statements were also recorded on 
9th July, 1996 and 12th July, 1996. The appellant filed a writ petition in the B 
High Court challenging the issuance of summons to him and in the writ 
petition precise grievance made was that the appellant cannot be "compelled" 
to give his statement in writing in connection with an offence under FERA. 
A learned single judge of the High Court after detailed discussion dismissed 
the writ petition. The appellant took the matter in a writ appeal. The writ 
appeal by a detailed order, was dismissed at the stage of admission itself. By C 
special leave, this appeal has been filed in this' Court. 
We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 
It is not denied that the statements of the appellant have been recorded 
by the respondent on 15th May, 1996, 9th July, 1996 and 12th July, 1996. D 
Learned counsel for the appellant did not dispute and rightly so that person 
to whom summons are issued under Section 40 of FERA may be called upon 
to give his statement in writing and sign it and such a course is not prohibited 
either by the statute or the Constitution. In our opinion there is no presumption 
that such a statement is always "involuntary''. In Amba Lal v. Union of India E 
and others, AIR (1961) SC 264 a Constitution Bench of this Court opined that 
such a course was desirable and observed that the giving of the statement 
in writing under the signatures of the maker safeguards the interest of the 
maker as well as the department and eliminates the possibility of making a 
complaint subsequently that the statement was not correctly recorded by the 
authorities. What has, however, been urged before us is that he cannot be F 
"compelled" to give such a statement Apart from the assertion of the appellant 
in the Court that the statements are ''extracted" under 'compulsion', which 
fact has been denied by the respondents, there is no other material placed 
on the record from which we may assume any element of"compulsion" being 
exercised as alleged by the appellant. 
G 
Despite our giving opportunities to the appellant to file copies of those 
statements in this Court to satisfy ourselves whether there was any element 
of "compulsion" visible from those statements, copies of those statements 
have been withheld for reasons best known to the appellant. As a matter of 
fact copies of those statements ought to have been filed with the special B 
144 
SUPREME COURT REPORT

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