LexC.G. GHANSHAMDAS & ORS. versus COLLECTOR OF MADRAS
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A B c C.G. GHANSHAMDAS & ORS. v. COLLECTOR OF MADRAS SEPTEMBER 12, 1986 [E.S. VENKATARAMlAH AND V. KHALID, J.l.I Tamil Nadu Court Fees & Suits Valuation Act, 1955, s. 51 and Article 3(iii) (A) ( 1) (a) of Schedule 11-Memorandum of Appeal u/s. 11 of Requisitioning Act, 1952-Court fee-Computation and payment of. ' Requisition & Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, ss. 3, 5, 7-Requisition and acquisition of Property-Distinction between. D Words & Phrases-'Order'-Meaning of. The property of the appellants continued to remain under requisi- tion by virtue of the several amendments made to the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act 1952 and the compensation payable in respect of it was required to be revised for a period of 5 years E from 7.3.75 to6.3.1980. As there was no agreement between the parties on the question of compensation payable for the said period, the said question was referred to an arbitrator under s. 8 of the Requisitioning "'t Act to determine the compensation payable. The arbitrator by his award fixed the compensation payable for the property at Rs.21,000 per month as against the claim of Rs. 77 ,270 per month made by the r· appellants. G H Aggrieved by the decision of the arbitrator the appellants filed an appeal before the High Court of Madras under s. 11 of the Requisition- ing Act. The Registry of the High Court raised an objection regarding the amount of court fee paid on the memorandum of appeal. The matter was placed before the Division Bench of the High Court and it held that the appellants were liable to pay court fee on the memorandum of appeal under s. 51 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act 1955 (for short, the Act) ad valorem on the amount of compensation which was in dispute in the appeal. in appeal to this Court, the appellants contended that the amount 754 , ·-1 C.G. GHANSHAMDAS v. COLL. OF MADRAS 755 of court fee payable on a memorandum of appeal filed under s. 11 of the Requisitioning Act should not be computed in accordance with s. 51 of the Act as a fixed court fee was payable under the residuary provision, that is, Art. 3 (iii) (A) (1) (a) of Schedule II of the Act. In support of this. contention the appellants raised two points; (i) that since there is uo transfer of title to the property which is requisitioned from its owuer to the Govermneut, the said trausactiou is uot au acquisition and heuce ·those provisions of the Requisitioning Act under which the property' is requisitioned do uot constitute a law providing for acquisition of pro- perty and therefore, s. 51 of the Act would not be applicable because it relates only to appeals filed against an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of land; and (ii) that the award made by the arbitrator wider s. 8 of the Requisition- ing Act not being an 'order' as defined in 'the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the appellants cannot be called upon to pay court fee in accord- ance with s. 51 of the Act since s. 51 refers to court fee payable on a memorandum of appeal against an 'order'. Dismissing the appeal, HELD: 1. The appeal before the High Court filed under s. 11 of the Requisitioning Act falls squarely under s. 51 of the Act. Theref9re, the court fee has to be paid on ad valorem basis as provided in Art. 1 pf Schedule I to the Act. It follows that the residuary Article, that is, Art. 3(iii) (A) (1) (a) of Schedule II to the Act is not attracted. [769E-F] 2(i) Section 3 of the Act states that in the Act 'unless .the context otherwise requires' the words and expressions defined in that section \ shall carry the meaning given to them in various cla. uses in that sec .. tion. /'-·- It is relevant to note that in section 51 of the Act which arises for ' consideration the word 'order' does not appear in isolation. The section ,..( states that the fee payable under the Act on a memorandum of appeal against an order relating to compensation in any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of property for public purposes shall be computed on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellants. The 'Order' referred to in s. 51 of the Act need not be an 'order' of a civil court as defined ins. 2(14) of the Code of Civil Procedure but shouid be an 'order' relating to compensa- tion under any Act for the time being in force for the acqu
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