LexaceLexace Ask the AI ›
⚖️ Ask the AI about your situation:🚗 Car Accident💼 Work / Job🏠 Housing / Eviction👪 Family / Divorce📋 Contract Dispute💰 Money Owed

C. ALBERT MORRIS versus K. CHANDRASEKARAN AND ORS.

Citation: [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 779 · Decided: 26-10-2005 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: AR. LAKSHMANAN · Disposal: Dismissed

Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case

Judgment (excerpt)

C. ALBERT MORRIS 
A 
v. 
K. CHANDRASEKARAN AND ORS. 
OCTOBER 26, 2005 
[DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN AND AL TAMAS KABIR, JJ.] 
B 
Petroleum Rules, 1976---'Rules 144 and 153(1)-Lease of vacant Land-
F or installation of retail outlet of-petrol-Accessory construction put up by 
tenant-Installation after getting No Objection Certificate from State-After C 
expiry of lease suit for eviction-Dismissal thereof for default-Landlord 
approaching the authorities for seeking cancellation of permission to tenant 
to store petroleum and also seeking revocation of No Objection Certificate-
Writ petition seeking non-renewal of licence to carry on petrol bunk as the 
tenant had lost right to the site-Allowed by High Court and upheld in writ 
appeal-Jn appeal, held: Mere continuance in occupation of the demised D 
premises after expiry of the lease, notwithstanding receipt of an amount by 
the landlord would not create a tenancy so as to confer on the erstwhile 
tenant the status of tenant or a right to be in possession-The word 'right' 
used is s. 153(1) only means a legal right to continue on the Land-'-Juridical 
possession or litigious possession do not connote a valid legal right to E 
continue in possession under the rule-Unless the person seeking a licence 
is in a position to establish a right to the site, he would not be entitled to 
hold or have his licence renewed-Since the leased premises was a vacant 
land, and the constructions thereon belonged to the tenant, he was not a 
statutory tenant in view of the construction· on the site°"·"Rent Control and 
Eviction-Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 1969. 
F 
The appellant was the dealer of the second respondent. The said 
dealership was being carried on in the leased site belonging to the first 
respondent-landlord. Government (\ad granted No Objection Certificate under 
Rule 144-(llof the Petroleum Rules, 1976 for the installation of the retail 
outlet of petrol and HSD. First respondent had only leased vacant site to put G 
up a petrol bunk with accessory constructions thereon. Respondent-landlord 
filed a suit for decree of eviction and possession of the leased land. The same 
was dismissed for default. Landlord filed application for restoration of the 
suit. During pendency landlord again issued a notice Of termination of lease. 
779 
H 
780 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 
" · A The defence of appellant-tenant was that he was a statutory tenant governed 
by the Rent Control Act as during renewal of the lease deed there were super-
structures. Landlord also approached the authorities seeking revocation of 
the No Objection Certificate granted to the appellant. He also sought a Writ 
of Mandamus before High Court seeking direction that the licence of the 
B appellant to carry on petrol bunk shall not be renewed. He contended that the 
same was liable to be cancelled under Rule 153(1) of the Petroleum Rules as 
the appellant had lost right to the site. The Writ Petition was allowed. It held 
that though the possession of the site did not entitle the appellant for renewal, 
he could be dispossessed only under due process of Jaw. In writ appeal, Division 
Bench confirmed the order of Single Judge holding that though the possession 
C was illegal but the filing of suit did not prevent the first respondent from 
seeking a writ remedy. Hence the present appeal. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. A mere continuance in occupation of the demised premises 
D after the expiry of the lease, notwithstanding the receipt of an amount by the 
quondam landlord would not create a tenancy so as to confer on the erstwhile 
tenant the status of tenant or a right to be in possession. Mere acceptance of 
rent by the landlord-respondent herein from the tenant in possession after 
the lease has been determined either by efflux of time or by notice to quit 
E would not create a tenancy so as to confer the erstwhile tenant the status of 
a tenant or a right to be in possession. [792-A, B; 799-G I 
F 
Bhawanji lakhamshi and Ors. v. Himatlal Jamnadas Dani and Ors., 
p 972] 2 SCR 890; Raptakos Brett & Co. ltd. v. Ganesh Property., [I 9981 7 
SCC I 84; Saleh Bros. v. K. Rajendran and Anr., AIR (1970) Madras 165; R. V. 
Bhupal Prasad v. State of A. P. and Ors. [I 9951 5 SCC 698; Karmani Industrial 
Bank ltd. v. The Province of Bengal and Ors., AIR (1951) SC 285 and 
Konchada Ramamurty Subudhi (dead) by his l.Rs. v. Gopinath Naik and Ors., 
AIR (1968) SC 919, relied on. 
Kai

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.