LexBUSCHING SCHMITZ PRIVATE LTD. versus P. T. MENGHANI AND ANR.
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
A B c D E F G H 312 BUSCHlNG SCHMITZ PRIVATE LTD. v. P. T. MENGHANI AND ANR. March, 17, 1977 [V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.] /11tcrprctatiou of statute-Legislature can be assunied 1101 to intend obvious literal interpretation resulting into obscurity-Whether statute can be mocked at-Section 4(1)(c), Delhi Rent Control Act 1958- Sec. 14, 14A, 25B-Delhi Rent Control Ordinance 24 of 1975-Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1976-/(iglit of Govenunent Offu;er who i's asked to racate Govenunent accom- 111odation to evict his tenant.-Whether can apply to preniises let out for com- 1nercial purpose-What is residential purpose-Triable is.sues-Meaning of. The respondent No. 1 landlord let out his building to the appellant, a com- pany to carry on business and use part of it for its manager's residence. The landlord was occupying residential premises allotted by the Central Govern_- ment. After the amendment of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, by OrCh· nance 24 of 1975 which was later replaced by Delhi Rent Control (Amen<tment) 1\ct, 1976, section 14A and 25B were added to the· Statute. Section 14 permits a landlord to evict the tenant if the premises let for residential purpose are required bonafide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for him.self or for any member of hip family dependent upon him. Section 14A provides that where a landlord is in occupation of any residential accommodation allotted to him by the Central Gnvemment or any local authority and if he is required by order made by that Government or authority to vacate such residential accom~ modation our the ground that he owns in the Union Territory of Delhi a resi- dential accommOOation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child, there shall accrue to the landlord a right to recover immew diately possession of any premises let out by him. The said provision has been given effect notwithstanding anythlng to the contrary in the Delhi Rent Act or any other law or the, custom or usage.. Section 25B provides for a summarY remedy. It prnvides that the Controller shall give to the1 tenant leave to con- test the application if the, affidavit filed by' the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession on the ground specified in section 4(1)(c) or 14A. The respondent was directed by the Government to vacate the Government accommodation on the ground that he had let out residential accon1modation of which he was owner. The respondent No. 1 accordingly filed eviction proceedings against the appellant· claiminf:.': possession under Section 14A. 'fhe appellant contended before the Rent Control1er that the ground did D.ot fall within the sweep of sec- tion 14A since the. premises were let out for residential-cum-commercial pur- poses to a joint Stock Company which was carrying on business besides using it forr the residence· of its Managing Director. This plea did not cut ice with the Controller who refused leave to contest. The· appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution which was dismissed. Tn appeal by special leave, the appellant contended that 1. Nothing in s.14A compels the landlord to occupy the premises after evicting the tenant. He could still let it for a higher rent take on lease from the private sector a sn1a1l house and make <i gain' from the difference flowing in rent. ~ 2. The· Controller could not shut him out from being heard if a triable issue emerged from the affidavit in opposition. In the pr~sent case such issues were present and, therefore, the Rent Controller was not justified in refusing leave to contest. 3. Section 14A does not apply in the present case since the premises were not residential premises as they were let out both for commer- cial and residential purposes. • • BUSCHING SCHMITZ (P) LTD. V. P. T. MENGHANI 313 (Krishna !yet, J.) Dismissing the· appeal, HELD : (I) It is fallacious to approximate section 25B(5) with Order 37 rule 3 ~f the Code of Civil Procedure. The social setting de1nan<ling summary proceeding, the. nature of the subject matter and above all, the Jegislati\'e dic- tion which has been deliberately designed, differ in the two provisions. Dis- closure of facts which disentitle recovery of possession is a sine qua non for grant of leave. [320F-A, 321A] (2) The definition of premises in secti
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.