BRIJENDRA NATH BHARGAVA & ANR. versus HARSH WARDHAN & ORS.

Citation: [1988] 2 S.C.R. 124 · Decided: 02-12-1987 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SABYASACHI MUKHERJI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
BRIJENDRA NATH BHARGAVA & ANR. 
v. 
HARSH WARDHAN & ORS. 
DECEMBER 2, 1987 
B 
[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND G.L. OZA, JJ.] 
c 
Landlord-Tenant matter-Tenant's appeal against Order of 
eviction on ground of material alteration made in the premises without 
landlord's permission-Under Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and 
Eviction) Act, 1950-Section 13( l)(c) thereof. 
In the year 1974, the then landlords of the property in dispute, 
Bhonri Lal and others, filed a suit for eviction against the tenants/ 
appellants on the ground of bona fide need, material alterations in the 
premises and default in payment of the rent. During the pendency of 
the suit, the present respondents purchased the property in 1979 and 
D continued with the suit for eviction. The trial Court passed a decree 
for eviction on the ground of material alterations-construction of a 
wooden balcony (Dochhatti}-made in the premises by the appellants 
under section 13(1)(c) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and 
Eviction) Act, 1950. The decree of the trial Court was affirmed in 
Second Appeal by the High Court. Aggrieved by the decision of the 
E High Court, the appellants appealed to this Court by special leave. 
Allowing the Appeal, the Court, 
HELD: The first notice in the case given to the tenants/appel· 
lants on behalf of the then landlord Bhonri Lal was through an 
F Advocate and there was no mention of the objection about any 
construction or material alteration at all. Another notice dated 
13.8.1974, given just a little before the filing of the suit for eviction, 
also did not contain any mention of any material alteration or cons· 
!ruction of the balcony (Dochatti). There was a reference to some 
damage to the floor of the property in dispute in that notice, but the 
G same was given up and not pressed. It was, therefore, plain that if the 
balcony fDochatti, which was a wooden structure, was a construction 
without the permission and consent of the landlord, he would have 
made it a ground for termination of the lease or a ground of eviction 
mentioned in any one of the two notices above-said, if not both. It was 
a signtficant factor that in the two notices, that construction was not 
ff mentioned as a ground. In his cross-examination, Bhonri Lal admit-
124 
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\ 
B.N. BHARGAVA, v. HARSH WARDHAN 
125 
A 
ted that no notice about the balcony had been given, and explained 
A 
away the reasons therefor. I l3lA-D I 
>if 
The present respondents purchased the property in dispute 
during the pendency of the suit. The statement of Bhonri Lal in cross-
examination, showed that he had given up his objection to the balcony, 
B 
and it was also clear from his evidence that the cost of a window, 
constructed in the year 1964 to give light and air to the balcony, had 
been borne by the landlord himself. In the context of that evidence, it 
was significant that even in the plaint it had not been clearly stated 
~-t-
that the balcony had been constructed in the year 1972 as was now 
alleged. It was also significant that what was now alleged-that the c 
balcony was supported on beams fixed in the walls and and pillars fixed 
' 
in the floor-was also not alleged in the plaint at all. It was also not 
1 
alleged in the plaint as to how the structure in question which was a 
wooden structure, easily removable according to the appellants, could 
' 
be said to be a material alteration or how the same had impaired or 
damaged or lowered the value of the property involved. It is true that 
D 
section 13(l)(c) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and 
,.. 
Eviction) Act, 1950, as it stands, does not require that in addition to 
the material alteration being there, it should be to lower or reduce the 
value of the property, but it was significant that all the three Courts 
below had not considered the omission of that allegation in the notices 
and the statement of Bhonri Lal and other discrepancies in the 
pleadings, and had come to the conclusion which could not be reached. 
E 
The only possible conclusion from these facts could be that either the 
bakony had been constructed with the implied consent of the landlord 
or that after seeing it the landlord had decided to waive his objection 
to it on an assurance given by the tenant, and, therefore, had not 
made it a ground for termination of the lease in his notices given 
F 
before the suit; the landlord had waived his right to file a suit on that 
ground. All the three Courts had failed to look

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