BRIJ NANDAN KANSAL versus STATE OF U.P. & ANR.

Citation: [1988] 3 S.C.R. 79 · Decided: 26-02-1988 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: E.S. VENKATARAMIAH · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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BRIJ NANDAN KANSAL 
v. 
STATE OF U.P. & ANR. 
FEBRUARY 26, 1988 
[E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND K.N. SINGH, JJ.] 
A 
B 
Service matter-Challenging order of dismissal-Denial of 
reasonable opportunity of defence contemplated by Article 311(2) 
before its amendment-Whether Administrative Tribunal has power to 
re_appraise evidence and record subsequent findings to hold that evi-
dence is not sufficient to sustain charges against government servant C 
involved. 
The appellant was in Government service. On a number of 
charges1framed against him, the State government referred his case to 
the Adnlinistrative Tribunal for enquiry. In respect of the six charges 
against the appellant, the Tribunal recorded findings that the first D 
charge was not proved but it recorded findings against the appellant in 
respect of the remaining charges. The Governor issued notice with a 
copy of the findings of the Tribunal to the appellant to show cause why 
he should not he dismissed. The appellant submitted reply to the show-
cause notice, which was referred to the Tribunal for its consideration. 
The Tribunal submitted a report dated July 7, 1971, recording the 
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finding that there was no convincing evidence to uphold the charges 
framed against the appellant. The State Government referred the 
matter to the Legal Remembrancer for opinion. The Legal Rememb-
rancer opined that there was sufficient evidence on record to uphold 
charges 2 to 5 against the appellant, which were of common pattern to 
the effect that the appellant had claimed travelling allowance at the rate F 
of first class railway fare without having actually travelled in that class 
on'four different occasions. The Governor therenpon disregarding the 
. findings of the Tribunal issued order dismissing the appellant. The 
appellant challenged the order of dismissal by a writ petition in the 
High Court. The High Court (Single Judge) allowed the writ petition G 
and quashed the order of dismissal. The respondent-State preferred a 
Letters Patent appeal. The Division Bench of the High Court allowed 
the appeal and set aside the order of the Single Judge of the High Court. 
The appellant then moved this Court for relief by this appeal. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court, 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1988] 3 S.C.R. 
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HELD: After· scrutiny of the two reports of the Administrative 
Tribunal and the note of the Legal Remembrancer, the Court found 
that the view taken by the Tribunal in its subsequent report dated July 
7' 1971, was positive in nature that there was no convincing evidence to 
sustain the charges 2 to 5 against the appellant. [848 I 
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B 
There was no justification for the view taken by the High Conrt. 
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The Tribunal was the inquiring authority. In its initial report dated 
May 7, 1970, it had recorded findings against the appellant, bot when 
the Governor referred the appellant's reply to the show--<:ause notice to 
the . Tribnnal for reconsideration of the matter, it recorded a positive 
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finding that there was no convincing evidence to support its earlier 
C findings. The Tribunal had acted within its jurisdiction in reappraising 
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the evidence in the light of the appellant. The State Government issued 
the, impugned order of dismissal on the basis of the opinion of the Legal 
Remembrancer without recording any reasons for disregarding the 
findings of the Tribunal. If the State Government chose to pass the 
order of dismissal, in all fairness, it should have recorded reasons for 
D the same, and in order to afford a reasonable opportunity to the appel-
lant, it was necessary for the Government to communicate to him the 
reasons for disagreement with the Tribunal's report. The report of the 
legal Remembrancer on the basis of which the Government has passed 
the impugned order, had never been communicated to the appellant 
and he was denied opportunity to meet the same. Article 3 ll(2) before 
E its amendment by the Constitution (forty-second Amendment) Act, 
1975, contemplated reasonable opportunity of defence even at the stage 
·of show--<:ause notice. The appellant had been denied opportunity of 
being heard at the stage of sbow--<:ause notice. [84E-H; 85A-B; F J 
The Tribunal in its report dated July 7, 1971 had categorically 
F recorded the finding that there was no evidence on record to prove the 
charge that the appellant had not purchased lst class tickets in advance 
relating to the journeys in question. The Tribunal ha

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