BRIJ MOHAN AND ORS. versus SMT. SUGRA BEGUM AND ORS.
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- ). BRIJ MOHAN AND ORS. v. SMT. SUGRA BEGUM AND ORS. JULY, 19, 1990 [L.M. SHARMA AND N.M. KASLIWAL, JJ.] Specific Relief Act-Specific pe1ormance of contract of sale of immovable property on basis of oral agreement alone-Heavy burden lies on plaintiff to prove consensus ad idem. Transfer of Properly Act-Section 55-Provision not applicable where patties consciously negotiated but failed in respect of any term or condition resulting in agreement not being concluded. The appellants-plaintiffs are four brothers. They filed a sui1 against defendant No. 1, Smt. Mahboohunnisa ยทBegum, (Since deceased and represented by legal heirs) for specific performance of oral contract of sale of a building in Hyderabad. The property was later sold hy defendant No. 1 to defendants Nos. 3 and 4. The plaintiffs' case was that plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2, on behalf of themselves and their younger brothers, plaintiffs Nos. 3 and 4, had preliminary negotiations for the purchase of the suit property through Shri Arif Ali, advocate; that eventually on 3rd May, 1979 they met Aril Ali and offered to pay Rs.10,00,000, which was the price demanded by the owner; that Arif Ali, after getting the confirmation of the said offer from the first defendant on phone, said that the plaintiffs should meet the first defendant on 6th May, 1979 and that she would in the mean- while purchase the stamp papers for making the formal agreement of sale incorporating the oral agreement arrived at on 3rd May, 1979; that on 6th May, 1979 the plaintiffs met the first defendant in the presence of Arif Ali and other, wherein the amount of earnest money to be paid, time for registration of the sale deed etc. were decided; that at that meeting Sbri Arif Ali, prepared first and the final drafts Of the receipt in his own handwriting and handed over these drafts to the first plaintiff to get the final draft typed and duly stamped; that Arif Ali also delivered the stamp papers to the first plaintiff for typing the formal agreement of sale; that at the meeting held on 6th May, 1979 the plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 were also permitted to proceed with the publica- tion of the notices in the newspapers; that after the public notice was published, the first defendant got a reply notice published and got 413 A B c D E F G H A B c 414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R. issued a legal notice dated 8.5. 79 through her advocate, alleging that there was no agreement for sale; that thereafter, the first and second plaintiffs made sincere and repeated attempts to convince the first defendant that there was in existence a concluded contract for sale of the suit property, and that the execution of the agreement of sale was a mere formality. On these allegations, the plaintiffs sought the relief of specific performance of the agreement. The first defendant in her written statement stated that certain negotiations had taken place between her and plaintiffs Nos. I and 2, but the negotiations had failed. It was further stated that there was no concluded or enforceable contract between the parties; that no price was settled or agreed upon and even the condition for advance payment aud other terms and conditions were not agreed upon; that no ftnal receipt or document had been prepared; and that the first defendant never asked for the purchase of stamp papers. The Trial Court found that on the facts and circumstances of the D case, it was established that the plaintiffs had entered into an oral contract of sale with the first defendant on 3.5. 79. The Trial Court accordingly decreed the plaintiffs' suit for specific performance. Two separate appeals, were filed in the High Court. A Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeals and set aside the decree E passed by the trial court. The High Court held that in order to determine the binding nature of a contract between the parties, the mere acceptance of sale price was not sufficient. The High Court further observed that in the absence of evidence that the other terms also were discussed over the phone and settled on 3.5. 79, it could not be said that there was a concluded contract on 3rd May, 1979, and that it F was obviously for that reason that a further meeting was fixed at the house of the 1st defendant on 6th May, 1979. The High Court did not agree with the contention of the plaintiffs that all the terms of contract, including the stipulation with regard to the payme
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