BRAHMA PRAKASH SHARMA AND OTHERS versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

Citation: [1953] 1 S.C.R. 1169 · Decided: 08-05-1953 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M. PATANJALI SASTRI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

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s.c . .R. 
SUPREME COURT REPOR'L'S 
li69 
suit automatiqally comes to an end and there is no 
1953 
doubt that such an order would Le a judgment. If, 011 
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Asrumatt 
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t e ot er iau , an or er IS ma e 
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Judge's summons to show cause why the leave shouldKumarRupendm 
not be rescinded, the result is, as Sir Lawrence 
Deb Raikot 
Jenkins pointed out(1), that a decision on a vital point 
and Others. 
adverse to the defendant, which goes to the very root 
of the suit, becomes final and decisive against him so Mukherjea ·'· 
far as the court making the order is concerned. This 
brings the order within the category of a 'judgment' 
as laid down in the Calcutta cases. 
'Ve need not 
express any final opinion as to the propriety or other-
wise of this view. It is enough for our purpose to 
state that there is a difference between an order refus-
ing to rescind leave granted under clause 12 of the 
Letters Patent and one under clause 13 directing the 
removal of a suit from one court to another, 11nd there 
is no good reason to hold that the principle applicable 
to one applies to the other also. 
The result, therefore, is that, in our opinion, the 
view taken by the High Court is right and this appeal 
should fail, and is dismissed with costs. 
Appeal dismissed. 
· Agent for the appellant : P. K. Bose. 
Agent for the respondent No. 1: Sukimwr Ghose 
for P. 0. Dutt. 
BRAHMA PRAKASH SHARMA AND O'L'HEHS 
19o3 
V. 
1lfay 8 
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH. 
[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MUKHERJEA, s. R. DAS, 
GHULAJVI HASAN and BHAGWA'l'l .JJ.] 
Oontenipt of Oonrts Act, 1926, s. 3 -Reflection on conduct or 
character of Judicial OJ)ir-ers - When wnonnts to contempt of court 
-Contempt proceedings-Guiding principles - Jlc!tters to be con-
siderecl- Relevancy nf S1tj'·rounrlin.q 
circnni.~tanre.fj-J11risrl.iction to 
be spa.ringly exercised. 
(1) 'Tide Vaghoji v. Ca1naji, I.L,H. 29 Born. 149 . 
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1170 
SUPREME COUR'L' REPOR'l'S 
[1953) 
1953 
The object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection 
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to judges personally from imputations to which they may be 
Bra~ima P·rakash exposed as individuals, but is intended to be a protection to the 
Sharma and 
public whose interest would be very much affected if, by the act 
Others 
or conduct of any party, the authority of the court is lowered 
v. 
and the sense of confidence which the people have in the adminis-
The State of 
tration of justice by it is weakened. 
U Uar P-radesh 
When the court itself is attacked, tirn summary jurisdiction by 
way of contempt ·proceedings must be exercised 'vith scrupulous 
care and only< when the case is clear antl beyond reasonable doubt. 
There are two primary considerations which should \Veigh 
'vith the court in such cases, viz., fir:lt wLether the reflection on 
the conduct or character of tho judge is within the limits of fair 
and reasonable criticism, and secondly, whether it is a mere libel 
or defamation of the judge or amounts to a contempt of tho court. 
If it is a mere defamatory attack on the judge and is not cal-
culated to interfere with the due comse of justice or th.a proper 
administration of the law by such conrt, it is not proper to pro· 
ceed by way of contempt. 
Where the question arises whether a defamatory statement 
directed against a judge is calculated to undermine the confidence 
of the public in the competency or integrity of the judge or is 
likely to deflect the court itself from a strict and unhesitant per-
formance of its duties, all the surrounding facts and circumstances 
under which the statement was made &nd the degree of publicity 
that was given to it would be relevant circumstances. The 
c1uestion is not to be cletermined solely with reference to the' 
language or contents of the statement made. 
The Executive Committee of a District Bar Association 
received several complaints against the way in which the Judicial 
Magistrate and the Revenue Officer of the District dispos.ed of 
cases and behaved towards litigants and lawyers, and passed a re-
solution which stated that ''it was their considered opinion that 
the two officers are thoroughly incompetent in law, do not inspire 
confidence in their judicial work, ai·e given to stating wrong facts 
when passing orders and are overbearing and discourteous to the 
litigant public and lawyers alike" and gave a list of various 
complaints against the officers. 
Thi:i resolution was passed in 
came

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