BRAHAMPAL @ SAMMAY AND ANR. versus NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY

Citation: [2020] 9 S.C.R. 504 · Decided: 07-08-2020 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: N.V. RAMANA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · cites 9 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 9 S.C.R.
[2020] 9 S.C.R. 504
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BRAHAMPAL @ SAMMAY AND ANR.
v.
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY
(Civil Appeal No. 2926 of 2020)
AUGUST 07, 2020
[N. V.  RAMANA, S. ABDUL NAZEER AND
SURYA KANT JJ.]
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988:
s. 173 – Delay of 45 days in filing appeal against order of
Motor Accident Claim Tribunal – Application for condonation of
delay and appeal dismissed by High Court – Appeal to Supreme
Court – Held: s. 173 provides limitation period for filing appeal –
The provision also gives sufficient discretionary powers to the Court
to condone delay in filing the appeal if it is satisfied that there
existed “sufficient cause” - The provision being a beneficial
legislation “sufficient cause” must be given liberal interpretation
to serve the object of the Act – In the present case delay of 45 days
has been properly explained – The strict approach taken in the
impugned order was hypertechnical and hence not sustainable –
Delay is condoned – Matter remanded to High Court to be decided
on merit – Limitation – Delay.
Delay:
Condonation of delay – Criteria to be adopted – Held: There
is no straight jacket formula for condonation of delay – The Courts
are required to take into consideration entire facts and circumstances
of the case as well as conduct of the parties while considering
condonation of delay – Keeping in view substantive rights of the
parties, undue emphasis should not be given to technicalities and
provisions cannot be viewed strictly as compared to commercial
claims.
Interpretation of Statutes:
Beneficial legislation – Interpretation of – Held: Interpretation
of beneficial legislation must be remedial and must be in furtherance
of the purpose which the statute seeks to serve.
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Words and Phrases:
Expressions “may” and “sufficient cause” — Interpretation
of, in the context of s. 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Chapter XII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a
beneficial legislation intended at protecting the rights of victims
affected in road accidents. Moreover, the Act is a self-contained
code in itself which provides procedures for filing claims, for
passing of award and for preferring an appeal. Even, the limitations
for preferring the remedies are contained in the code itself. The
interpretation of a beneficial legislation must be remedial and
must be in furtherance with the purpose which the statute seeks
to serve. [Paras 8 and 9][509-F-G]
Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v. Deputy Director,
Employees State Insurance Corporation. (2009) 9 SCC
61 : [2009] 13 SCR 1139; Vimla Devi v. National
Insurance Co. Ltd., (2019) 2 SCC 186 : [2018] 13 SCR
753 – relied on.
2.1 Section 173 of the Act provides that, any person
aggrieved by the award passed by the Tribunal may approach the
High Court within ninety days. However, the second proviso
states that the High Court “may” still entertain such appeal even
after the expiry of ninety days, if the appellant satisfies the Court
that there exists sufficient reason behind the delay. [Para 12][511-
D]
2.2 Ordinarily, the word “may” is not a word of compulsion.
It is an enabling word and it only confers capacity, power or
authority and implies discretion.“It is used in a statute to indicate
that something may be done which prior to it could not be done”.
[Para 13][511-E]
Chinnamarkathian alias Muthu Gounder v. Ayyavoo
alias Periana Gounder (1982) 1 SCC 159 : [1982] 2
SCR 146; Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya v. Shree
Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd. [1962] 3 Suppl. SCR 973 –
relied on.
Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P.
Singh, 14th Edn. - referred to.
BRAHAMPAL @ SAMMAY AND ANR. v.
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 9 S.C.R.
2.3 The legislature by usage of the word “may” in Section
173 of the Act, conferred sufficient discretionary powers upon
the Court to entertain appeals even beyond the period of ninety
days. Such discretionary power is conferred upon the Courts, to
enforce the rights of the victims and their dependents. The
legislature intended that Courts must have such power so as to
ensure that substantive justice is not trumped by technicalities.
If the specific conditions wherein the power could be exercised
is also provided in the statute, then the Court must exercise the
aforesaid discretion in the manner as specified by the statute
itself. In the second proviso to Section 173 it is stated that Court
has the p

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