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BOPANNA VENKATESWARALOO AND OTHERS versus SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL JAIL, HYDERABAD STATE

Citation: [1953] 1 S.C.R. 905 · Decided: 24-11-1952 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

• 
8.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
905 
The result, therefore, is that we allow the appeal in 
1963 
part and modffy the judgment of the High Court. A 
0 
preliminary decree should be drawn up in favour of Nag"~::~::,aini 
the plaintiff against defendant No. 6 alone for a sum 
v. 
of Rs. 55,287 annas odd which will carry interest at Raja Vadmu 
7!% simple per annum. Interest will be calculated Viswa•undara 
on Rs. 52,287 on and from the date of the mortgage, Rao and Others 
while on the balance of Rs. 3,000 interest will run 
MukherjeaJ. 
from 5th November, 1930. We make no order as to 
costs of this court or of the High Court. The plaintiff 
will have his costs of the trial court. 
Appeal allowed in part. 
Agent for the appellant: Al. 8. K. Aiyangar. 
Agent for respondent No. 1 : Ganpat Rai. 
BOPPANNA VENKATESWARALOO AND OTHERS 
1962 
V • 
N ovembcr24 
SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL JAIL, 
HYDERABAD STATE. 
UNION OF INDIA-Intervener. 
[MEIIB CHAND MAHAJAN, S.R. DAS and BHAGWATIJJ.] 
P1·eventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act (XLI of 1952), 
s. 11-A-Act passed on 22nd August, 1952-Brought into force on 
30th Sevteinber, 1952-Detention exviring on 30th September, 1952 
-Order on 22nd September, 1959, extending detention uvto 31st 
December, 1952 -Validity of order of extension-General Clauses 
Act (X of 1897), s. 22-Act LXI of 1952, s. 11-A (2), apvlicability of. 
The petitioner was served with an oriler of detention on the 
20th October, 1951, and, after a reference to the Advisory Board, 
the Govemment confirmed the detention and specified 31st March, 
1952, as the date up to which the detention was to continue. 
On 
the 20th l\farcb, 1952, the detention was extended till the 30th 
September, 1952, and on the 22nd September, 1952, the detention 
was again extended up to the 31st December, 1952. It was con-
tended on behalf of the petitioner that the Government had no 
power on 22nd September, 1952, to extend the detention.beyond the 
1st October, 1952, as the Preventive Detention (Second Amend-
ment) Act of 1952, even though it had received the assent of the 
117 
• 
006 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1953] 
1952 
President in August 1952, came into force only on the 30\h Sep-
tember, 1952: 
' 
Boppanna 
Held, (i) that the order extending the period of detention made 
Venkateswaraloo on the 22nd September could not be justified under the provisions 
and Others 
of s. 22 of the General Clauses Act, 1897; the word "order" in the 
v. 
said section means an order laying down directions aboub the 
Superinffndent, manner in v.rhich things are to be done under the Act and th•3 sec-
Central Jail, 
tion does not 1nean that a subs.tantive order against a particular 
Hyderabad State. person can be made under a pr•Jvision of an Act before that Act 
has come into force. 
{ii) The words "the order" iu s. 11-A of the Preventive De-
tention {Second Amendment) Act, 1952, do not refer to the initial 
detention order, as no period of detention could legally be spocified 
in that order, but to the order of detention as eventually confirm-
ed under s. 11(1) of the Act and the detention of the petitioner 
could not therefore he treated a> automatically extended up to the 
1st April, 1953, under the provisions of s. 11-A by reason of the 
fact that in the initial order for the detention of the petitioner no 
period of detention had been specified. 
(iii) The detention of the petitioner could not continue after 
the 30th September, 1952, by force of the provisions of s. ll-A(2) 
of the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act, l 952, 
merely because the date on which the petitioner's detention was 
to expire, namely, the ilOth Sep•ember, 1952, happened by accid-
ent or coincidence to be ic'.entical with the date on which the 
first Amendment Act (Act XXXIV of 1952) was to expire, for 
s. ll-A(2) merely provides that if a shorter period is specified in 
the order, the detenu would be entitled lo be released. 
(iv) The expression "shorter period" in s. 11-A (2) means a 
period which does not extend up to the ls\ April, 1953, or up to 
the end of the period of 12 months mentioned in the section and 
<loes not mean a period ending before the 30th September, 1952. 
(v) The cletention of the petitioner after the 30th September, 
i 952, was therefore illegal. 
ORIGINAL JURISDICTIO~: Petitions (Nos. 335, 350, 
356, 362 and 366 of 1952) under article 32 of the Con-
stitution for writs in the nature of habeas corpus. 
A.S.R. Chari (arnicus curiae) for the pe

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