BISHNU DEO SHAW @ BISHNU DAYAL versus STATE OF WEST BENGAL

Citation: [1979] 3 S.C.R. 355 · Decided: 22-02-1979 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: V.R. KRISHNA IYER · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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355 
BISHNU DEO SHAW@ BISHNU DAYAL 
A 
v. 
STATE OF WEST BENGAL 
February 22, 1979 
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND 0. CllINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J 
B 
Demand of death for murder, rationale of section 302 I.P.C. vis-a-vis-
Section 354(3) of the Crl. P.C. 1973-"Special Reason:/', meaning of-Sec-
tion 354(3) 360. 361 of Crl. P.C.-Scope of. 
The appellant was convicted by the Additional Session's Judge Alipore 
for the murder of his son 00.d sentenCed to death. The reason given by the 
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Sessions Judge was that the murder was "cruel and brutal" and that the facts 
showed the "grim determination" of the accused to kill the deceased. The 
Sessions Judge made no reference to the motive of the accused for the com-
mission of the murder. The High Court while confirming the conviction and 
sentence observed that the accused had previously murdered his wife, suspect-
ing her infidelity that the sentence of imprisonment imposed on him for the 
mur~er of his wife had no sobering effect, that he suspected that the deceased 
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in the present case was not his own son and so he murdered him without 
any mercy or remorse, and that he, therefore deserved no mercy. 
Allowing the appeal by special leave limited to the question of sentence, 
the Court 
HELD : 1. There were no "special reasons" justifying the imposition of the 
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death penalty. 
[3 71 Fl 
(a) The Sessions Judge was wrong in imposing the sentence of 
death 
without even a reference to the reason v"hy the appellant comn1itted the 
murder. 
[371 CJ 
(b) The observation of the High Court that the 
appellant 
deserved no 
mercy because he showed no mercy smacks very much of punishment by way 
of retribution. 
[371 CJ 
(c) From the evidence, it is clear that the appellant 'Whs a moody person 
who had for years been brooding over the suspected infidelity of his wife and 
the injury of having a son foisted on him. The mere use of adjectives like 
"cruel and brutal" does not supply the special reasons contemplated by 
section 354(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. [3.710-E] 
Rajendra Prasad v. State of Utrar Pradesh, [1979] 3 S.C.R. 78, applied. 
2. "Special reasons
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' are reasons which are special with reference to 
the 
offender, with reference to constitutional and legislative directives and with 
reference to the times, that is, with reference to contemporary ideas in the 
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fields of criminology and connected sciences. Special 
reasons 
are 
those 
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which lead inevitably to the conclusion that the offender is beyond redemp· 
tion, having due regard to his personality and proclivity, to the 
legislative 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
356 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1979] 3 s.c.R, 
policy of reformation of the offender and to the advances made 
in 
the 
methods of treatment etc. Section 354(3) of the 1973 Code has narrowed the 
discretion of sentence for murder. Death sentence is ordinarily ruled out and 
can only be imposed for "Special reasons". 
Judges are left ·with the task of 
discovering "special reasons". 
[368 D-E. 370E-F] 
(a) Apart from Section 354(3), there is another prov1s1on in the Code 
which also uses the significant expression "Special reasons.". It is Section 361, 
Section 360 of the 1973 Code re-enacts, in substance, Section 562 
of ~16 
1898 Code and provides for the release on probation of good 
conduct or 
after admonition any person not under twenty-one years of age who is COn• 
victed of an offence punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for 
a 
term of seven years or less, or any person under twenty·one years of age 
or any woman who is convicted of an offence not punishable with death or 
imprisonment for life, if no previous offence is proved against the 
offender, 
and if it appears to the Court having regard to the age, character or antec-e· 
dents of the offender, and to the circunlStances in which the offellce was 
committed, that it is expedient that the offender should be re1eased on proba· 
tion of good conduct or after admonition. If the Court refrains from den.I· 
ing with an offen<Jer under Section 360 or under the provisions of the Pro· 
bation of Offenders Act, or any other law for the treatment, training, or 
rehabilitation of youthful offenders, where the Court could 
have done, so, 
Section 361, which is a new provision in the 1973 Code makes it tnendatory 
for the Court to record in its judgment the "Special reasons" for not doing· 
so. Section 361 thus casts a duty upon the Court to apply the 
prov1s1ons 
of

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