BISHAMBHAR PRASAD versus M/S. ARFAT PETROCHEMICALS PVT. LTD. AND ORS
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
A B C D E F G H 230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R. [2023] 7 S.C.R. 230 230 BISHAMBHAR PRASAD v. M/s. ARFAT PETROCHEMICALS PVT. LTD. AND ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 2963 of 2023 Etc.) APRIL 20, 2023 [SURYA KANT AND VIKRAM NATH, JJ.] Industrial Development β Industrial land β Appeals from judgment passed by the High Court whereby the Writ Petition filed by Respondent No.1 was allowed β As a corollary, the decision by the Cabinet Committee of the State of Rajasthan, and resulting instructions issued to the Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation Ltd. (βRIICOβ) to cancel a series of permissions and approvals granted/awarded to Respondent No.1 in respect of industrial land in Kota, Rajasthan, were set aside β Whether the Large-Scale Industrial Area (LIA), Kota has been always under the management and control of the State Government or it was transferred to RIICO pursuant to Government Order dated 18.09.1979 β Whether the 1979 Rules of RIICO are statutory in nature β Whether failure to observe Principles of Natural Justice by the State Government vitiated its decision to annul the permissions /approvals granted by RIICO in favour of Respondent No.1 β Whether the State Government could have exercised its powers under Article 138 of the AoA of RIICO to direct cancellation β Whether the Rules of Business were not followed β Does the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations and Promissory Estoppel apply in favour of Respondent No. 1 β Whether the Appellant Unions are entitled to relief β Held: There was an uninterrupted and subsisting relationship of lessor and lessee between the State Government and either JKSL or Respondent No. 1, in the context of LIA, Kota β From the first lease deed executed in 1967, till date, the State Government has maintained the position of lessor β The lease with JKSL, and all leases thereafter with JKSL and/or Respondent No. 1, have been signed under the 1959 Rules β The terms of the lease are clearly in compliance with the 1959 Rules β The land in LIA, Kota was never transferred to RIICO under the Government Order dated 18.09.1979 β The State Government has always maintained title and ownership of the area β The land was also never allotted to RIICO on a A B C D E F G H 231 leasehold basis under Rule 11A of the 1959 Rules β Thus, RIICO was never expressly given any leasehold rights, and had no authority to further sub-lease the land, along with other corresponding powers, under Rule 12 of the 1959 Rules β In any case, Rule 11A of the 1959 Rules is of no importance, as there had to be an express allotment of the land to RIICO on a leasehold basis after the coming into force of Rules 11A and 12 β No such express allocation was ever made in favour of RIICO β The 1979 Rules are not statutory in nature β The reference to the 1979 Rules in Rule 12 of the 1959 Rules, does not accord any statutory recognition to the former β There was no violation of the Principles of Natural Justice in this case β The entire basis for granting permission for conversion of the land, and subdivision of the plots, was on an incorrect assumption of power by RIICO under the 1979 Rules, to act as the lessor of LIA, Kota β RIICO was never given any leasehold rights over the land β When the basis for a benefit received by a party is itself invalid, there is no question of giving the party a chance to be heard β The State Government was competent to issue directions under Art.138 of the AoA of RIICO, to cancel the supplementary lease deeds and attendant permissions β This fell squarely within the ambit of Art.138 of the Articles of Association β There was no violation of the Rajasthan Rules of Business as the sub-committee which recommended the cancellation of the permissions /approvals to Respondent No.1, was acting for and on behalf of the entire Council of Ministers β Hence, the Rules of Business were complied with β There was no legitimate expectation nor promissory estoppel that could operate to the benefit of Respondent No. 1, as, once again, no such defences could be raised on the back of RIICOβs own erroneous utilization of powers that vest only with the rightful lessor of LIA, Kota, which is the State Government β Further, public interest overrides both these doctrines, and cannot come to the aid of a private party, when the larger interests of society are involved β The supplementary leases signed between Respondent No.1 and RIICO are unsustainable β RIICO did not possess the authority to ent
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
Lex