BISHAMBAR NATH KOHLI AND OTHERS versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS

Citation: [1966] 2 S.C.R. 158 · Decided: 11-10-1965 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

BISHAMBAR NATH KOHLI AND OTHERS 
v. 
STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH AND OTHERS 
October 11, 1965 
[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, 
M. HIDAYATULLAH, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.] 
Administration of Evacuee Property Act (31 of 1950) ss. 27 and 
58(3)-0rder passed by Deputy Custodian under repealed Ordinance-
Jurlsdlctil>n of Custodian-Genera/ to revise-Procedure to be followed in 
disposal of revision. 
Under s. 6 of-Ordinance 12 of 1949, the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee 
Property notified certain property to be evacuee property in October 1949. 
No claim was preferred by any one in pursuance of the notification and 
the Central Government acquired the property under the Displaced Persons 
(Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 and put it up for sale by 
public auction in 1957. 
The predecessor in title of the appellants pur-
chased the property. In 1961, the State of Uttar Pradesh applied under 
&. 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, invoking the 
revisional jurisdiction of the Custodian-General, claiming that the property 
belonged to the State and not to the evacuee and that therefore, the Deputy 
Custodian had no power to declare it as evru:uee property_ The Custodian 
General upheld the plea of tho State. 
In appeal to this Court, the jurisdiction of the Custodian-General to 
entertain the petition was questioned. 
· 
HELD : (i) The Custodian-General had the power to entertain the 
revision application filed by the State. 
By Ordinance 27 of 1949, which repealed Ordinance 12 of 1949, a 
proceeding commenced or anything done or action taken under the earlier 
Ordinance was to be deemed a proceeding commenced, thing done and 
action taken under the later Ordinance, as if it were in force on the 
date on which the proceeding was commenced, thing was dC>ne or action 
was taken. Sec. 58(3) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, which 
repealed Ordinance 27 of 1949, contained a similar deeming provision that 
anything done or action ta.ken in· exercise of the power conferred under 
Ordinance 27 of 1949 is to be deemed to have been done or taken in 
exercise of the power conferred by or under the Act, as if the Act were 
in force on the day on which such thing was done or action 
was taken. By this chain of fictions, things done and actions taken under 
Ordinance 12 of 1949 are to be deemed to have been done or taken in 
exercise of the powers conferred under the Act, as if the Act were in 
force on the day on which such thing was done or action was taken. 
[164 B-EJ 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
By the first part of s. 58(3) of the Act, the previous operation of 
the repealed statutes survi,.es the repeal. Thereby matters and transaction. 
past and closed remain operative. But the·saving of the previous opera-
tion of the repealed law is not to be read, as saving the future operation 
of the previous law. 
The previous law stands repealed and it has not 
H 
for the future the partial operation as is prescribed by s. 6 of the General 
Clauses Act, 1897. The rule contained in s. 6 of the General Clauses Act 
applies only if a different intention does not appear and 
by enacting 
158 
• 
• 
B. N. KOHLI V. STATE (Shah, /.) 
159 
/I. 
s. 58(3) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act Parliament has 
expressed a different intention. 
Under s. 58(3), all things done and 
actions taken under the repealed statute are deemed to be done or taken 
in exercise of the powers conferred by or under the repealing Act, as if 
that Act were in force on the day on which the thing was done or action 
was taken. [168 C; 167 H; 168 BJ 
B 
c 
£ 
G 
The order made by .the Deputy Custodian was d·xlared final by 
s. 30(6) of Ordinance 12 of 1949. If fictionally lhe order is deemed to 
have been passed under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, as 
if the Act were in operation in October, 1949, it i• difficult to escape the 
conclusion that the order would be subject to the appellate and revisional 
jurisdiction of the authorities who have the appellate or revisional power 
by virtue of the provisions conferring those powers and which must also 
be deemed to have been in force on the date when the impugned order was 
passed. 
The use of the expression "subject thereto" in s. 58(3) cannot 
attribute to the pre,·ious operation of the repealed statute an overriding 
effect so as to deprive the authorities constituted under the repealing Act 
of their power to entertain appeals or revision applications, which th

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