BIPIN CHANDRA PARSHOTTAMDAS PATEL (VAKIL) versus STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS.

Citation: [2003] 3 S.C.R. 533 · Decided: 14-04-2003 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S. RAJENDRA BABU · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 4 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

, 
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BIPIN CHANDRA PARSHOTTAMDAS PATEL (VAKIL) 
A 
v. 
STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. 
APRIL 14, 2003 
[S. RAJENDRA BABU, S.B. SINHA AND DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN, JJ.] B 
Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963; Section 40: Suspension of President 
of Municipalities-On ground of commission of criminal offences-Detention 
in judicial custody-High Court affirmed order of suspension-Trial during C 
detention-Meaning and Interpretation of-Held: Word "Trial" is capable of 
two interpretations, one is restricted to interpretation covering detention after 
framing of charges, other is liberal construction covering detention at any 
stage-Since legislature intends holding of such office by the person against 
whom no criminal proceeding was initiated nor he was detained in prison, the 
word 'trial' cannot be accorded a restricted meaning in order to keep away D 
shady characters holding public offices-Hence High Court rightly affirmed 
the order of suspension-Interpretation of Statutes-Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973; Sections 167, 173, 190, 228 & 309-Penal Code, 1860; 
Sections 142, 147, 148, 149 & 307-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947-
Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949. 
Petitioner was elected President of Anand Municipalities, Gujarat, 
against whom respondent had lodged two Fl Rs. for commission of offences 
under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149 and 307 IPC r/w Section 25(C) of Arms 
Act and Section 135 of Bombay Police Act. Petitioner was arrested and 
detained in judicial custody for certain period. The concerned authority, 
in exercise of power under Section 40 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 
directed suspension of the said President of Municipalities. Petitioner 
challenged the order of suspension by filing an appeal which was dismissed 
by the High Court, a writ petition and writ appeal filed thereafter were 
also dismissed by the High Court affirming order of suspension. Hence 
the present petition. 
It was contended for the petitioner that since an investigation or an 
inquiry could not be termed as trial as per provisions of law, detention of 
petitioner in judicial custody during investigation could not be considered 
as a detention during trial. 
533 
E 
F 
G 
H 
A 
534 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2003) 3 S.C.R. 
On behalf of the respondent, it was contended that since the word 
'trial' has no fixed meaning, it could be assigned broad meaning in 
consonance with the purpose and object of the Act. 
Dismissing the petition by majority, the Court 
B 
HELD: Per Rajendra Babu, J. : 
I. I. The manifest intention and obvious purpose of Section 40 of the 
Gujarat Municipalities Act is to ensure proper functioning of the Office 
of the President or Vice-President of the Municipalities by keeping the 
public confidence. A person, who is detained in prison, will not be able to 
C effectively discharge his public duties. So the Act aims to keep those 
persons, against whom serious criminal proceedings are initiated or who 
are detained in prisons, away from the public office of the President or 
Vice-President of the Municipalities until they are cleared of the charge. 
Actual conviction for the alleged offence is not a necessary pre-condition 
D for any suspension. For the purpose of suspension under part I of Section 
40(1) of the Act, initiation of criminal proceeding in respect of any offence 
alleged to have been committed by him/her is sufficient. The proper 
meaning of words-"detained in prison during trial" in part II of sub-
section 40(1) could only be deciphered accordingly. The meaning of these 
words should be in perfect tune with the spirit of Section 40. Otherwise, 
E the purpose of the Section will be defeated. Therefore, the word "trial" 
used in the expression "detained in prison during trial" cannot be singled 
out and cannot be accorded a restricted meaning. The meaning will have 
to promote the reason and spirit of Section 40 of the Act. 1540-C, G, HI 
State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey, 119571SCR279 and Omprakash 
F Shivaprakash v. K.I. Kuriakose, 119991 8 sec 633, relied on. 
1.2. The cardinal dictum that the legislature laid down vide Section 
40 is to allow only those persons, against whom there are no criminal 
proceedings, to man the office of the Municipal President or Vice-
G President. 1540-FI 
1.3. The word "trial" in Section 40 of the Act cannot be supplanted 
with a straight jacket meaning so as to cover all situations. No doubt, the 
word "trial" used in part I of sub-section 40(1) is capable of two 
interpret

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