LexBIMAL KUMAR & ANOTHER versus SHAKUNTALA DEBI & OTHERS
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[2012] 1 S.C.R. 195 BIMAL KUMAR & ANOTHER v. SHAKUNTALA DEBI & OTHERS (Civil Appeal No. 2524 of 2012) "FEBRUARY 27, 2012 [DALVEER BHANDARI AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.] DECREE: A B Final decree and Preliminary decree - Distinction c between -Discussed. Preliminary decree - Compromise application - Tenor of application showed that the parties to the compromise settled the entire controversy and they were in separate and exclusive possession of the properties allotted to their respective shares D - The compromise application did not contain any clause regarding the future course of action - Whether the decree passed by the court of first instance on the basis of compromise had become enforceable or it had the status of a preliminary decree requiring completion of a final decree E proceeding to make it executable - Held: The parties were absolutely conscious and rightly so, that their rights had been fructified and their possession had been exclusively determined - They were well aware that the decree was final in nature as their shares were allotted and nothing remained F to be done by metes and bounds - Their rights had attained finality and no further enquiry from any spectrum was required to be carried out - The whole thing had been embodied in the decree passed on the foundation of compromise - Thus the compromise decree was the final decree. G LIMITATION ACT, 1963: Article 136 - Execution application - Whether hit by bar of limitation - Partition suit - Predecessor of appellant one of the defendant proceeded ex 195 H 196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 2 S.C.R. A parte - Compromise decree - Subsequent suit for partition filed by appellants on the ground that earlier decree was obtained by fraud - Dismissed - Execution application filed . after limitation period - Objections by appellants that execution proceeding was barred by limitation - Held: There was no stay B of the earlier judgment or any proceedings emanating therefrom - There was no impediment or disability in the way of the decree holder to execute the decree but the same was not done - Therefore, initiation of execution proceedings was indubitably barred by limitation. c Words and phrases: Compromise/Settlement - Meaning of. A partition suit was compromised between the parties. 'K', the predecessor of the appellants although D had appeared in the suit and filed written statement, however, thereafter chose not to contest. The compromise petition stated that the parties were in separate and exclusive possession of the properties respectively belonging to them and had obtained E separate and exclusive possession of the properties allotted to their respective shares. The tried court accepted the petition of compromise and passed a compromise decree on 3.4.1964 treating 'K' ex parte. 'K' initiated a fresh partition suit on the ground that the earlier decree F was obtained by fraud. The said suit was dismissed on 27th August, 1994. The appeal thereagainst was dismissed for want of prosecution on 6.1.2004. At this juncture, the respondents filed execution case seeking execution of the compromise decree. In the meantime, 'K' G died and the execution was levied against his legal heirs, the appellants. An objection was raised by the appellants that the execution proceeding was barred by limitation. The Sub-Judge dismissed the execution proceedings on the ground that it was absolutely barred by limitation. The H single judge of the High Court allowed the revision on the BIMAL KUMAR & ANR. v. SHAKUNTALA DEBI & 197 ORS. ground that the execution case was not barred by A limitation. The questions which arose for consideration in the instant appeal were whether the decree passed by the court of first instance on the basis of compromise had 8 become enforceable or it had the status of a preliminary decree requiring completion of a final decree proceeding to make it executable and; whether the execution proceeding was untenable being hit by the law of limitation. C Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. Perusal of the tenor of the entire compromise application showed that the parties to the compromise settled the entire controversy. The D defendant No. 3 who was the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants was not allotted any share. As is perceptible from the terms of the compromise which formed a part of the decree, the parties had conceded that they were in separate and excl
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