BIMAL CHAND JAIN versus SRI GOPAL AGARWAL
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
A 124 B c D E F G H BIMAL CHAND JAIN v. SRI GOPAL AGARWAL July 27, 1981 [R.S. PATHAK, 0.CHINNAPPA REDDY AND BA '.IARUL !SLAM, JJ. l Civil Procedure Code Rule 5 Order XV-D~fau/t in payment of arrears of rent during the pendency of suit-Court if competent to strike off defence. Rule 5 of Order XV C.P.C. was re-enacted by the U.P. Act 1976 and it pro- vided that the defendant shall deposit the entire amount of rent due from him together with interest at or before the first bearing of the suit for eviction and also continue to deposit the monthly amount regularly and that on failure to do so, his defence was liable to be struck off. Another rule provided that before striking off the defence, the Court may consider any representation made in that behalf. The respondent filed a suit against the appellant for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent. The appellant filed written statement and resisted the suit. The appellant during the pendency of the suit committed default in depositing the rent regularly and the respondent filed application under Rule 5 Order XV C.P.C. for striking off the appellant's defence. The appellant attempted to show that he had been depositing th1:; rent as required by law. The trial court accepted the application and held that the appellant had failed to make any representation permitted by him under sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order XV within time. The trial court accordingly struck off the defence and the High Court affirmed the order of the trial court on the ground that where no representation was made or if made was filed beyod time, the Court was bound to strike off the defence and enjoyed no discretion in the matter. Allowing the Special Leave Petition, HELD : An order under sub-rule (1) striking off the defence is in the nature of a penalty. A serious responsibi1ity rests on the court in the matter and the power is not to be exercised mechanically. There is a reserve of discretion vested in the court entitling it not to strike off the defence if on the facts and circum- stances already existing on the record, it finds good reason for not doing so. It will always be a matter for the judgn1ent of the court to decide whether on the material before it, notwithstanding the absence of a representation under sub.rule (2), the defence should or should not be struck off. The word "may" in sub-rule (1) merely vests power in the court to strike off the defence. It does not oblige it to do so in every case of default. L128 C-D] i - BIMAL CHAND v. SRI GOPAL (Pathak, J.) 125 Puran Cha.ndv. Prav;n Gupta, Civi1 Revision No. 356of1978 decided on A October 30, 1980 All. H.C. overruled. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1759 of 1981 Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 3rd December, 1980 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision No. 525 of 1980 F.S. Nariman and K.K. Mohan, for the Appellant. R. K. Garg, Pramod Swarup and Sunil Kumar Jain, for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, J. In a suit for ejectment of a lessee and for recovery of arrears of rent, does the court enjoy any discretion not to strike off the defence in case the defendant has defaulted in depositing the rent and has also failed to make any representation within the terms of Rule 5 of Order XV, Code of Civil Procedure? That question is raised in this defendant's appeal by special leave against an order of the Allahabad High Court maintaining in revision that the trial court has no discretion in the circumstances but must strike off the defence. The respondent as lessor filed a suit against the appellant as lessee for his ejectment and for recovery of arrears of rent. The appellant filed a written statement and resisted the suit. During the pendency of the suit the respondent filed an application praying that the appellant's defence be struck off in view of Rule 5 of Order XV, Code of Civil Procedure, inasmuch as the appellant had com- mitted default in depositing the rent regularly. The appellant opposed the application and attempted to show that he had been depositing the rent as required by the law. The trial court held that while the rental arrears admitted by the appellant to be due had been deposited in accordance with the relevant provision of sub-rule (!) of Rule 5 of Order XV, he had failed to make regular deposits of the monthly rent accruing during the pendency of the suit as req
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
Lex